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Stereotypes and memory 1 
Chapter 1 
A posteriori stereotype activation and memory 
This thesis deals with the influence of activated stereotypes on the 
retrieval of information from memory. The question I address is: How does 
a later activated stereotype affect the retrieval of earlier encoded 
information about a person or about members of a social group? 
Imagine you're sitting in a quiet 'no smoking' train compartment 
and you're reading an exciting book that captures your full attention. After a 
stop, a group of six or seven boys enter the compartment. They carry a few 
six-packs of beer along and you spot that one of the boys holds a copy of 
Shakespeare's "Hamlet" in his hand. The red-haired boy that took the seat 
opposite yours friendly smiles and offers you a cigarette. Very soon, the boys 
get more and more excited; they start yelling and screaming and a little later 
they are ruining the interior of the compartment. You are a bit intimidated 
and you want to keep on reading so you decide to go to another 
compartment. You sit down and return to reading. 
During the short period of time that you shared the compartment 
with this group of boys, you may have stored several details in memory, 
e.g., the copy of Hamlet, the six-packs, the waste-paper basket that was torn 
off the wall. 
The next day, your newspaper reveals that you shared the train with a 
group of soccer-hooligans. In other words, a stereotype is activated. What 
will happen? You may think: "Ah, yes, I remember, the guys rearranging 
the interior of the train". What details will spring to mind? The yelling and 
screaming? The torn off waste-paper basket? Hamlet? 
The aim of this thesis is to study the impact of stereotypes on 
memory. More specifically, the question studied is how an a posteriori 
activated stereotype affects the retrieval of earlier encoded stereotype-
consistent and stereotype-inconsistent information? 
Stereotypes and retrieval: An overview of the literature 
First, an overview will be provided of the research addressing the 
influence of later activated stereotypes on retrieval of stereotype-consistent 
and stereotype-inconsistent information. The experiments reviewed 
roughly employ the same experimental paradigm and the same procedure. 
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First, subjects receive (behavioral) information about a person or a group of 
persons (e.g., Hank sometimes fights in bars). Subsequently, additional 
target information is provided about the social category the person (or 
group) belongs to (e.g., Hank is a soccer-hooligan). The dependent measure 
is a memory measure. In most studies, a comparison is made between 
memory for stereotype-consistent information and stereotype-inconsistent 
information. 
The work of Snyder and Uranowitz 
In 1978, Snyder and Uranowitz published an article in which they 
argue that the memory of past events involving a person is reconstructed in 
the light of one's current beliefs about that person. They posit that people do 
not simply remember something by retrieving fixed information. Instead, 
information in memory is actively reconstructed (cf, e.g., Bartlett, 1932; 
Dooling & Christiaansen, 1977; Loftus, 1975; Spiro, 1976). "..we do not 
remember an event by activating or "replaying" some fixed memory trace. 
Rather, we construct a schematic representation of our past experience by 
piecing together remembered bits and pieces with new facts that we 
(knowingly or unknowingly) supply to flesh out or augment our emerging 
knowledge of the past" (Snyder & Uranowitz, 1978, p. 942). Thus, when we 
learn something new, these new events are used to reconstruct older 
information in memory. What we retrieve from memory is biased by our 
newly acquired knowledge. Snyder and Uranowitz proposed that social 
stereotypes may be capable of instigating such a reconstruction process. The 
hypothesis under consideration in their experiment was that subjects would 
reconstruct information in memory when a stereotype is activated after 
subjects are presented with information about a person. Furthermore, they 
expected that the information subjects would retrieve from memory would 
be biased, in the sense that stereotype-consistent information would be 
easier to retrieve than stereotype-inconsistent information. 
The participants in their study received information about a woman 
named "Betty K" and were asked to form an impression of this woman. 
Specifically, subjects read a case history containing, among other things, 
information about her youth, high school years and relationship with her 
parents. Later, some subjects were told that Betty К was currently living a 
lesbian lifestyle, some others were told that she lived a heterosexual 
lifestyle. A control group was given no additional information. 
Stereotypes and memory 3 
A week later, the subjects' recognition of the presented stimulus 
information was measured. Subjects received 36 multiple-choice questions 
about the information concerning Betty К they had received a week earlier. 
All questions contained four choice options. The options were chosen in 
such a way that some answers were consistent with the stereotype of 
lesbians, some were consistent with the stereotype of heterosexuals and 
some were neutral with respect to these stereotypes. The question under 
consideration was whether or not subjects would "reconstruct" the 
information about Betty K, that is, would they bias the retrieval of this 
information as a result of the information about her current (lesbian or 
heterosexual) lifestyle ? 
There was evidence indicating that subjects indeed reconstructed 
their impression of Betty K. Subjects made stereotypical errors during 
recognition. That is, subjects who were told that Betty К was a lesbian 
answered more questions in a way consistent with the stereotype of lesbians 
(suggesting a reconstruction bias in the direction consistent with the 
stereotype) than did subjects under heterosexual stereotype conditions. 
Conversely, subjects in the heterosexual stereotype condition made more 
stereotypically heterosexual errors than did subjects in the lesbian stereotype 
condition. 
Results also revealed that subjects who were led to believe that Betty 
К was heterosexual, showed better recognition for information that was 
stereotypically heterosexual than subjects who were led to believe that Betty 
К was a lesbian and control subjects. This was the only reliable effect on this 
measure. It indicates that a later activated stereotype may enhance 
recognition of stereotype-consistent information. However, this conclusion 
should be treated with caution since subjects who were led to believe that 
Betty К was a lesbian did not recognize more stereotypically lesbian 
information than control subjects (or subjects led to believe that Betty К was 
heterosexual). 
Critique on Snyder and Uranowitz 
Snyder and Uranowitz's finding that a later activated stereotype may 
lead to better retrieval of stereotype-consistent information compared to 
stereotype-inconsistent information was discredited a few years later. First, 
Clark and Woll (1981) replicated Snyder and Uranowitz's (1978) experiment 
and found no evidence for effects of stereotypes on memory. 
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Second, Bellezza and Bower (1981) criticized Snyder and Uranowitz's 
conclusion that the later activated stereotype leads to biased retrieval. They 
show in their study that recognition measures (as used by Snyder and 
Uranowitz) are sensitive to guessing biases1. That is, when corrected for 
guessing the recognition of stereotype-consistent information in the 
stereotype afterwards condition is no longer superior to that in the no 
stereotype control condition. What this comes down to is that, in case one 
wants to study stereotype-induced retrieval biases, a free recall measure 
would be more appropriate than a recognition measure. 
Later research on stereotypes and retrieval 
Despite the criticism on the conclusions drawn by Snyder and 
Uranowitz (1978), the effects they obtained - better memory of stereotype-
consistent information than stereotype-inconsistent information after 
stereotype activation - were replicated by others. In a study conducted by 
Cohen (1981), subjects watched a videotape about a woman and were later 
told that, depending on experimental conditions, the woman was either a 
waitress or a librarian. In a subsequent recognition task, it was found that 
memory for information consistent with the stereotype was superior to 
memory for stereotype-inconsistent information. These results were 
replicated in a second experiment. In sum, Cohen (1981), unlike Clark and 
Woll (1981), was able to replicate the results of Snyder & Uranowitz (1978). 
A study conducted by Lutz (1983) provides further support. Lutz also 
replicated Snyder and Uranowitz's study. However, in this study, both free 
recall and recognition were measured. It was shown that subjects indeed 
recalled information consistent with a stereotype better than information 
inconsistent with a stereotype. On the recognition measure, the same as 
used by Snyder and Uranowitz, the data replicated the free recall data. That 
is, a consistency bias was again obtained. So despite earlier scepticism, it 
seems that a posteriori stereotype activation affects memory. In most of the 
studies conducted later, the consistency bias, that is, better retrieval of 
information consistent with a later activated concept than retrieval of 
information inconsistent with a later activated concept, could be replicated 
(Hirt, Erickson & McDonald, 1993: Pyszczynski, LaPrelle & Greenberg, 1988; 
Wyer, Bodenhausen & Srull, 1984 but see, Belmore & Hubbard, 1987). 
In a study by Wyer, Bodenhausen and Srull (1984), subjects received 
behavioral information about a person or about a group. Afterwards, they 
activated a trait concept. In their study, a memory advantage of consistent 
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information (here, consistent with the trait) over inconsistent information 
was obtained for both person perception and group perception and on both a 
free recall measure and a recognition measure. 
Pyszczynski, LaPrelle and Greenberg (1988) provided subjects with 
information about events in the life of a fictitional undergraduate student. 
Some of the events were negative and some were positive. Later, 
participants were given a "Student Profile" either describing the 
undergraduate student rather positively or rather negatively. A free recall 
task revealed that subjects retrieved more consistent information than 
inconsistent information from memory. In other words, subjects who read 
the positive profile showed better memory for positive events than for 
negative events while the opposite was true for students who had read the 
negative profile. 
Hirt, Erickson and McDonald (1993) provided subjects with a list of 
the midterm exam scores. Later, they manipulated subjects expectancies 
about the student's future performance (improve versus decline). 
Subsequently, subjects read about the student's final exam scores. These 
scores were either consistent or inconsistent with the expectancy. In a free 
recall task (exp. 1) participants were asked to recall the student's midterm 
exam scores. Results indicated that the expectancy indeed biased retrieval. 
Consistent information (expectancy-consistent scores) was retrieved with 
greater accuracy than inconsistent information (expectancy-inconsistent 
scores). 
The nature of the memory bias 
The picture that emerges from most of the studies cited above is that 
upon a posteriori stereotype activation stereotype-consistent information 
seems to be recalled and recognized better than stereotype-inconsistent 
information (see also Rojahn & Pettigrew's, 1992, meta-analysis results). 
What we do not know, however, is whether stereotype activation makes 
consistent information easier to retrieve, or whether stereotype activation 
makes inconsistent information harder to retrieve, or both. In this section, 
we will try to shed more light on the question whether stereotype activation 
enhances retrieval of stereotype-consistent information, impairs retrieval of 
inconsistent information, or both. 
Pyszczynski et al. posited that an a posteriori activated stereotype 
might function as a retrieval cue (see Srull & Wyer, 1989; Wyer, 
Bodenhausen & Srull, 1984). They argue that a later activated stereotype 
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increases the ability to access previously encoded stereotype-consistent 
information. This explanation suggests that an a posteriori activated 
stereotype would enhance the retrieval of stereotype-consistent 
information. However, whether a stereotype indeed leads to better memory 
of stereotype-consistent information cannot be determined by the data they 
report. What they report is that there is a memory advantage of stereotype-
consistent information over stereotype-inconsistent information after the 
activation of a (positive or negative) stereotype. These effects do not warrant 
the conclusion that stereotype activation enhances the recall of stereotype-
consistent information. The obtained memory advantage might just as well 
have been due to reduced recall of stereotype-inconsistent information. In 
brief, whether or not an a posteriori activated stereotype enhances recall of 
stereotype-consistent information, reduced recall of stereotype-inconsistent 
information, or both, can only be established when one compares memory 
in the stereotype-afterwards condition with memory in a no stereotype 
control condition. 
If we take a look at the literature discussed earlier, we discover that 
only a few studies have been conducted studying retrieval effects by 
comparing a posteriori stereotype activation with a no stereotype control 
condition. The results of these studies are inconclusive. 
As said earlier, Snyder and Uranowitz's (1978) stereotype afterwards 
versus no stereotype comparisons revealed only one significant effect on 
recognition of consistent information. Furthermore, Clark and Woll (1981) 
do not report enhanced recall or recognition of consistent information in 
the stereotype afterwards condition compared to the no stereotype 
condition. In their study, they do not obtain a memory bias anyway (that is, 
under posterior schema activation conditions). 
Bodenhausen (1988) used a control condition in which no stereotype 
was activated. However, in this study, it is hard to determine which 
behavior is inconsistent with the stereotype and which behavior is 
consistent with the stereotype. Subjects read information about a criminal 
act. Information consisted of both incriminating and exonarating evidence. 
The suspect was either described as "Carlos Ramirez, born in Albuquerque, 
New Mexico" (stereotype condition) or as "Robert Johnson, born In Dayton, 
Ohio" (no stereotype activation). It is plausible that subjects treated the 
exonarating evidence (and the incriminating evidence) as consistent in one 
experimental condition and inconsistent in the other condition. Hence, it 
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does not seem warranted to regard the condition with the "neutral" 
stereotype (Robert Johnson) as a control condition. 
In sum, it is not yet clear what causes the memory bias obtained in 
most experiments discussed above. Thus, it is still possible that a stereotype 
activated afterwards enhances the retrieval of consistent information, it is 
also possible that a stereotype reduces the retrieval of inconsistent 
information, and it is possible that both effects may be obtained. 
Summary of the present dissertation 
What I set out to do in the present thesis is: 1) To give a more precise 
factual description of the effect of an a posteriori activated stereotype on 
earlier encoded stereotype-consistent and stereotype-inconsistent behavioral 
information than the current literature allows; 2) To provide a tentative 
theoretical account for the obtained a posteriori stereotype effects; and 3) To 
present experimental evidence supporting the advanced explanation as well 
as ruling out potential alternative explanations. 
The first experiment to be reported in this thesis (see Chapter 2) was 
aimed at determining the nature of the memory bias. Does a posteriori 
stereotype activation enhance memory of stereotype-consistent 
information, or does it impair memory of inconsistent information, or 
both? We examined this question by using a recognition paradigm in which 
an a posteriori stereotype condition was compared with a no stereotype 
control condition. In this experiment, subjects were provided with 
behavioral information about two social groups. Under conditions in which 
the groups were labelled after encoding (as environmental activists or 
professional soldiers), recognition of stereotype-consistent information was 
superior to recognition of stereotype-inconsistent information (as was the 
case in many of the cited studies). More importantly, the comparison of the 
a posteriori stereotype activation condition with the no stereotype control 
condition showed a recognition decrease of stereotype-inconsistent 
behaviors due to afterwards stereotype activation, and no effect at all on the 
stereotype-consistent behaviors. 
As said before, recognition measures may be subject to guessing 
biases. Therefore, it seemed worthwhile to demonstrate the robustness of 
the findings of experiment 1 with a more appropriate free recall measure. 
Hence, in a subsequent experiment (experiment 1 in Chapter 4) we 
replicated the first experiment while using a recall task to assess memory. 
The results of this study show that recall of stereotype-inconsistent behavior 
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deteriorated due to a posteriori stereotype activation, while recall of 
stereotype-consistent behaviors remained unaffected, which replicates the 
recognition results of the first experiment. In sum, it seems indeed that the 
a posteriori activated impairs the recall of stereotype-inconsistent 
information. 
The above experiments show that an a posteriori activated stereotype 
somehow impedes memory for behavioral information that is inconsistent 
with the stereotype — in other words we tend to forget having seen the copy 
of Shakespeare's Hamlet after we learned that these boys in the train were 
soccer-hooligans —, while we remember stereotype-consistent behaviors just 
as well as when no stereotype was activated — that is, we do remember the 
yelling and screaming, and the boys tearing off the waste-paper basket 
irrespective of being informed that they were soccer-hooligans. We obtained 
evidence for consistency bias in memory using both a recognition and a free 
recall paradigm, suggesting that the phenomenon is fairly robust. 
Having thus established the nature of the phenomenon, we suggested 
a tentative "guided retrieval" explanation for this memory bias. Our guided 
retrieval explanation contains five basic propositions. First, it is assumed 
that behavioral information is encoded and and stored in memory in terms 
of traits. For instance, the yelling and screaming, the boy ruining the 
compartment, may all be stored under the stored under the trait concept 
aggressive, while the possession of the copy of Hamlet may betray 
intelligence. Second, these trait-behavior clusters may be consistent with an 
activated stereotype, e.g., soccer-hooligans are expected to be aggressive, or 
inconsistent with the stereotype, that is, they are not expected to be 
intelligent. Third, a memory search is presumably guided by trait concepts. 
We assume that traits, abstract concepts summarizing behavior, serve as 
starting points for the memory search for behavioral examples related to the 
trait. For instance, activation of the trait intelligence may bring the memory 
of having seen the copy of Hamlet to mind. Fourth, a posteriori stereotype 
activation has the effect of facilitating access to traits that fit in with the 
stereotype, and of hindering or inhibiting access to stereotype-inconsistent 
traits (and hence to the behavioral information stored under it). Finally, 
behaviors that as such are mutually unrelated, e.g., intelligence and 
aggressive behaviors, are stored in memory in separate trait-behavior 
clusters, while behaviors having conflicting conflicting implications for the 
same underlying trait dimension (e.g., aggressive and peaceloving 
behaviors) are stored under the same trait-behavior cluster. We would 
predict on the basis of such a "guided retrieval" theory that a stereotype 
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hinders retrieval of stereotype-inconsistent behaviors only when these are 
stored in a separate (stereotype-inconsistent) trait-behavior cluster, but that 
retrieval of stereotype-inconsistent behaviors would not suffer from 
stereotype activation when it is stored in memory in a (stereotype-related) 
trait-behavior cluster together with stereotype-consistent behaviors. The 
latter means that the soccer hooligan stereotype would hinder access to 
separately stored intelligent behaviors (e.g., you do not remember the copy 
of Hamlet), but not access to friendly and peaceful behaviors (e.g., the boy 
offering you the cigarette). 
As our argument entails assumptions concerning the organization of 
behavioral information in memory either in terms of separate traits for 
stereotype-consistent and stereotype-inconsistent information or in terms of 
a shared trait-behavior cluster for stereotype-consistent and directly 
conflicting stereotype-inconsistent information, we designed an experiment 
to study this presumed memorial organization of behavioral information. 
In this experiment (see Chapter 3), subjects were asked to form an 
impression of a group of people (soccer-hooligans). Subsequently, they were 
provided either with stereotype-consistent and stereotype-inconsistent 
information bearing on the same dimension (aggressive and peaceloving 
behaviors) or with stereotype-consistent and stereotype-inconsistent 
behaviors bearing on different trait dimensions (aggressive and intelligent 
behaviors). Later, they were presented with a free recall task. 
The organization of behavioral information in memory in terms of 
trait-behavior clusters may be inferred from the order in which behavioral 
items are reproduced in free recall. It is assumed that items that are stored 
under the same trait-behavior cluster are more likely to be remembered 
consecutively than items from different trait-behavior clusters (as would, 
incidentally, follow from Associative Network models of trait-behavior 
organization in memory). The extent to which stereotype-consistent and 
stereotype-inconsistent behaviors are consecutively reproduced (or 
"clustered") in free recall is indicated by a clustering index (Roenker, 
Thompson and Brown's, 1971, ARC index) and by conditional recall 
probabilities. Both these measures were used in our 'memorial 
organization' experiment (Chapter 3) to assess clustering. 
It appeared from the results of this experiment that, as predicted, 
stereotype-consistent and stereotype-inconsistent behavioral items bearing 
on different trait dimensions were clustered in free recall in terms of 
separate clusters for consistent and inconsistent items, while stereotype-
consistent and stereotype-inconsistent items having implications for the 
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same underlying dimension seemed to be grouped together in the same 
trait-behavior cluster. In sum, the obtained evidence supported the assumed 
underlying memorial organization of stereotype-consistent and stereotype-
inconsistent behavioral information. 
The role of trait-behavior clusters in a posteriori stereotype effects on 
memory was studied in a subsequent experiment (experiment 2 in Chapter 
4). In this experiment, subjects were asked to form an impression of a group. 
Then, they were presented either with stereotype-consistent and stereotype-
inconsistent information bearing on the same dimension or with 
stereotype-consistent and stereotype-inconsistent behaviors bearing on 
different trait dimensions. After subjects read the behavioral information, 
the stereotype was activated for half of the subjects. The other half did not 
receive this information. Recall data indicated that trait dimensions indeed 
guided the retrieval process. It was found in the stereotype afterwards 
condition that, in comparison to the control condition in which no 
stereotype was activated, recall of stereotype-inconsistent information did 
not deteriorate when this information was stored under the same trait-
behavior cluster as the stereotype-consistent information. However, recall 
of stereotype-inconsistent information stored separately decreased 
substantially after a posteriori stereotype activation. 
The results obtained suggest, in our interpretation, that a posteriori 
stereotypes serve to de-activate stereotype-inconsistent trait constructs in 
memory, thereby impeding recall of stereotype-inconsistent behaviors (but, 
as the theory specifies, only when these are stored in a separate stereotype-
inconsistent trait cluster). The paradigms employed sofar, however, do not 
fully rule out a strategic explanation, that is, subjects might intentionally 
select stereotype-consistent items as appropriate responses, and discard 
retrieved stereotype-inconsistent items as inappropriate. This alternative 
explanation would require that the subjects realize that the activated 
stereotype pertains to the group they had received information about a little 
while ago. If stereotype activation unrelated to the stimulus groups would 
still lead to deteriorated recall of stereotype-inconsistent behavior, a strategic 
account would seem implausible. 
Whether deteriorated recall of stereotype-inconsistent information 
ensues from a strategic, deliberate process or from an unintentional process 
was studied in an experiment in which we altered the stereotype activation 
manipulation (experiment 3 in Chapter 4). In this experiment, the 
stereotype activation manipulation was seemingly unrelated to the 
behavioral information subjects read earlier. First, subjects read about 
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behaviors of members of a certain group. Subsequently, half of the subjects 
were asked to help out a colleague and to perform a short task unrelated to 
the rest of the experiment. They were to think about a professor and to write 
down anything that came to mind with respect to the lifestyle, behaviors 
and appearance of a typical professor. After they finished this task, they were 
presented with a free recall task. The data exactly replicated previous results. 
Again, in the a posteriori stereotype condition the recall of separately stored 
stereotype-inconsistent information was significantly worse compared to 
control subjects that were not requested to think about a professors. As a 
result, the conclusion can be drawn that deteriorated recall of stereotype-
inconsistent information after stereotype-activation is the consequence of 
an unintentional process. Even when the activated stereotype does not 
pertain to the behavioral information encoded earlier, recall of this 
information is affected by the stereotype. 
In our view, the a posteriori stereotype suppresses memorial access to 
stereotype-inconsistent trait-behavior clusters thereby reducing recall of the 
stereotype-inconsistent behaviors stored under it. Alternatively, however, it 
may be argued that it is not so much de-activated access to stereotype-
inconsistent traits causing the effect, but rather enhanced access to 
stereotype-consistent traits. In other words, reduced recall of separately 
stored stereotype-inconsistent behaviors may simply be a byproduct of the 
subjects preferentially accessing stereotype-consistent traits. 
To assess the role of enhanced access to stereotype-consistent traits in 
producing the reduced recall of stereotype-inconsistent behaviors, an 
experiment was conducted to study stereotype effects on memory of earlier 
encoded information which did not contain any stereotype-consistent 
information to begin with (experiment 4 in Chapter 4). In this study, 
subjects were provided with information inconsistent with a stereotype 
(either soccer-hooligans or professors) and with information that was 
irrelevant with respect to the stereotype. After subjects read the 
information, the stereotype was activated in the same way as in the 
experiment summarized above (experiment 3, Chapter 4). The results 
showed deteriorated recall of stereotype-inconsistent behaviors due to a 
posteriori stereotype activation to occur even in the absence of stereotype-
consistent behaviors. Furthermore, this reduced recall of stereotype-
inconsistent behaviors occurred while the a posteriori stereotype did not 
affect the recall of stereotype-neutral ('irrelevant') behaviors, suggesting 
suppressed access to stereotype-inconsistent traits. 
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Finally, the guided retrieval explanation of stereotype-induced 
impeded recall of stereotype-inconsistent behaviors contains the 
assumption that stereotype activation inhibits (or de-activates) access to 
stereotype-inconsistent traits (and, as a consequence, to stereotype-
inconsistent behaviors). This inhibited access at the level of traits was 
subjected to a separate test in Chapter 5. 
Three experiments (the experiments in Chapter 5) were designed to 
study inhibition of inconsistent traits in memory. In all experiments, 
subjects were primed with a stereotype. In experiment 1, inhibition effects 
were measured with a lexical decision task. It was found that primed 
subjects responded slower to stereotype-inconsistent traits in comparison to 
responses on the same traits made by no-prime control subjects (and 
compared to the recognition of stereotype-neutral traits), thus corroborating 
the proposed inhibitory effects of stereotype activation. 
In experiment 2, subjects were asked to identify trait words that were 
hidden in word puzzles. Although the evidence was statistically weak, 
inhibition effects were again obtained. In this identification task, primed 
subjects identified inconsistent trait words with greater difficulty than no-
prime control subjects. Also, in the stereotype prime condition, stereotype-
inconsistent trait words were identified more poorly than stereotype-neutral 
words. In experiment 3, in which slightly modified puzzles were used, these 
results were replicated. In the experiments we made use of a positively 
evaluated stereotype (professors) as well as a negatively evaluated stereotype 
(soccer hooligans). In sum, these experiment confirmed the notion that 
stereotype activation inhibits access to inconsistent traits in memory. 
Remember that the next day you read in your newspaper that those 
boys on the train were soccer-hooligans? One does not expect soccer-
hooligans to be intelligent, or interested in literature and culture. Therefore, 
this a posteriori activated stereotype would render the memory of having 
seen a copy of Shakespeare's Hamlet in the hand of one of the boys 
inaccessible, since it inhibits access the concept of intelligence. You would 
remember the destructive and aggressive behaviors, because these are 
stereotype-consistent. And probably you would also remember the red-
haired boy offering you a cigarette. The latter friendly and peaceloving 
gesture conflicts with aggressiveness, it would therefore be stored under the 
same trait-behavior cluster and remain accessible in memory even after the 
activation of the hooligan stereotype. 
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Note 
1. A guessing bias may result from the tendency to react affirmatively to 
stereotype-consistent items in the recognition task on those occasions on 
which one does not really remember whether or not one has seen the item. 
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Chapter 2 
Timing of schema activation and memory: Inhibited access to 
inconsistent information1 
In the present experiment, recognition of consistent and inconsistent 
information was measured as a function of time of schema activation. A 
schema was either activated before or after encoding, or not at all. Schema 
activation after encoding reduced recognition of inconsistent information 
while schema activation before encoding enhanced it (in comparison to the 
no schema control condition). Recognition of consistent information 
appeared to be unaffected by time of schema activation. It is argued that an a 
posteriori activated schema inhibits access to inconsistent information. In 
the Discussion a tentative theoretical explanation is provided. 
Most research on the impact of schema activation on information 
processing focuses on differential memory for consistent and inconsistent 
information given an activated schema (see Rojahn & Pettigrew, 1922; 
Stangor & McMillan, 1992, for reviews). Such studies throw light on the 
relative (rather than absolute) memory advantages brought about by 
schémas. The effects of additional variables, such as overload or distraction, 
may further enable one to reconstruct the way in which schémas function 
in the encoding and retrieval of information. 
Yet, the most direct way to disentangle encoding and retrieval effects 
of schémas seems to be (1) the comparison of memory of consistent and 
inconsistent information between a condition in which a schema is 
activated prior to information presentation and a condition in which a 
schema is activated after encoding (prior to the retrieval or recognition task) 
and (2) the comparison between a schema activated afterwards condition 
and a no schema control condition. The control condition seems crucial. 
Since in a no schema control condition it remains undefined what is 
schema-consistent and what is schema-inconsistent, neither encoding nor 
retrieval can be affected by the schema. In a condition in which a schema is 
activated after the presentation of stimulus information (prior to the 
memory task), there cannot have been a differential encoding effect, but 
schema-consistent information may benefit from the schema in the 
retrieval (or recognition) process, whereas retrieval (or recognition) of 
schema-inconsistent information may be impaired due to the a posteriori 
activated schema. Thus, the comparison of the effects of a schema 
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afterwards condition with a no schema control condition would reveal pure 
retrieval and/or recognition effects of the schema. 
It may be argued that a schema activated before the presentation of 
stimulus information plays a role both in the encoding phase and, if the 
recall or recognition task immediately follows the stimulus presentation 
phase, in the retrieval and in the recognition of information. Therefore, the 
comparison of a prior schema condition with a schema afterwards condition 
would be directly indicative of the pure encoding effects of the schema. 
The comparison between prior schema activation conditions and 
schema afterwards conditions is made by several researchers. Most 
investigators obtain a better memory for inconsistent information in prior 
schema activation conditions compared to a posteriori schema activation 
conditions (Bodenhausen, 1988; Pyszczynski, LaPrelle & Greenberg, 1987; 
Wyer, Bodenhausen & Srull, 1984; but see Belmore & Hubbard, 1987). As 
argued above, this suggests that prior schema activation leads to better 
encoding of inconsistent compared to consistent information. Most 
investigators agree that this effect is due to the heightened attention that is 
given to unexpected, inconsistent information (cf. Hastie, 1980; Wyer & 
Srull, 1989), because more effort is needed to integrate this information in 
an impression than to integrate expected, consistent information. This 
explanation is supported by the finding that the superior recall of 
inconsistent information disappears when subjects are prevented from 
forming an impression (that is, when subjects are prevented from encoding 
the information thoroughly), for instance by manipulating overload 
situations (Dijksterhuis & Van Knippenberg, 1995b; Macrae, Hewstone & 
Griffiths, 1993; Srull, 1981; Stangor & Duan, 1991). 
Few studies have been conducted studying retrieval effects by 
comparing a posteriori schema activation with a no schema condition. 
Snyder and Uranowitz's (1978) schema afterwards-no schema comparisons 
revealed only one marginally significant effect on recognition of consistent 
information. This effect, however, may be accounted for by guessing biases 
(see Bellezza & Bower, 1981). Furthermore, Belmore and Hubbard (1987) and 
Clark and Woll (1981) do not report enhanced recall or recognition of 
consistent information in the schema afterwards condition compared to the 
no schema condition. On the other hand, a posteriori schema activation 
does seem to affect retrieval. Most studies investigating the impact of a 
posteriori schema activation, without using a comparison with a no schema 
control condition, obtain a retrieval advantage for consistent information 
over inconsistent information (e.g. Bodenhausen, 1988; Cohen, 1981; Hirt, 
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Erickson & McDonald, 1993; Pyszczynski, LaPrelle & Greenberg, 1987; Snyder 
& Uranowitz, 1978; Wyer, Bodenhausen & Srull, 1984). As argued above, 
however, the latter studies are inconclusive with regard to whether there is 
a retrieval advantage for schema-consistent, or a retrieval disadvantage for 
schema-inconsistent information, or both. 
In sum, while the literature suggests that schema activation leads to 
better encoding of schema-inconsistent information, the pure retrieval or 
recognition effects of schema activation are still unclear. The main purpose 
of the present study is to provide a test of encoding and retrieval effects of 
time of schema activation by making the comparison between memory 
under the influence of a posteriori schema activation with memory under 
prior schema activation conditions and memory under no-schema control 
conditions. 
Method 
Subjects and design 
Sixty undergraduate students of the Social Sciences Faculty of the 
University of Nijmegen participated in the experiment. Subjects were 
randomly assigned to three conditions: a schema-before condition (stimulus 
groups were labeled environmental activists and professional soldiers 
before the behavioral information was given), a schema-after condition 
(stimulus groups were labeled environmental activists and professional 
soldiers after the behavioral information was given, but before the 
measurement of the dependent variables), and a no-schema condition (the 
stimulus groups were designated A and В without further labeling 
throughout the experiment). 
Construction of the stimulus material 
A pilot-study was conducted to select descriptively consistent and 
descriptively inconsistent information for two social groups. Twenty-three 
subjects rated the selected descriptions on two ten-point scales, one 
measuring the degree of stereotypicality for environmental activists, the 
other measuring the degree of stereotypicality for professional soldiers. A 
high score indicated a high level of consistency with the stereotype, a low 
score represented an inconsistent description. A selection was drawn, to 
obtain neutral, moderately consistent descriptions and moderately 
inconsistent descriptions. 
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Subsequently, booklets were constructed in which one behavioral 
description was presented on each page. All descriptions were accompanied 
by first name and group membership (e.g. "John, a member of group A, 
often visits rock concerts"). To avoid male/female categorizations and also 
because a female professional soldier might be perceived as inconsistent, 
only male names were used. All booklets contained 36 descriptions (24 for 
group A and 12 for group B)2. For half of the subjects, the large group (24 
descriptions) contained environmental activists. For the remaining subjects 
the large group contained professional soldiers. The labels A and В were 
counterbalanced. The order of presentation of the descriptions was 
randomly determined in each booklet. 
For every group in any stimulus set, half of the descriptions were 
descriptively neutral. For every group, one-fourth of the descriptions was 
descriptively consistent with the group label and one-fourth was 
descriptively inconsistent with the group label. All items assigned to one 
group in the stimulus set were descriptively neutral for the other group. For 
subjects in the schema-before condition, the booklet started with a message 
stating that group A (B) consists of environmental activists and that group В 
(A) consists of professional soldiers. For both the no-schema and the 
schema-after condition, the behavioral information was provided for 
groups A and В without additional information. The subjects in the 
schema-after condition were informed on the first page of the questionnaire 
that group A (B) consisted of environmental activists and that group В (A) 
consisted of professional soldiers. 
Procedure 
Subjects were told that they were participating in an experiment on 
information processing. They were informed that they would receive 
information about two real groups. They were asked to form impressions of 
the groups while reading the information. Subjects were not allowed to 
tum to earlier pages. Furthermore, subjects were told that the names of the 
stimulus persons were fictitious. 
After they read the descriptions, subjects were given a questionale 
containing the dependent measures. After participants had completed this 
questionnaire, they were paid and debriefed. 
Dependent measures 
The behavioral descriptions were again presented (in a different order 
compared to the stimulus material), now without mentioning the name of 
the person and the group membership (e.g. "A member of group often 
visits rock concerts"). Subjects were asked to indicate the group membership 
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of the person who performed each behavior, by simply filling in an A or a В 
in the blank space. The list was used to calculate the percentages of the 
correctly attributed descriptively consistent and inconsistent behaviors. 
Results 
A 2 (relative group size) χ 3 (time of schema activation) between-
subjects χ 2 (consistency of items) within-subjects ANOVA revealed that the 
time of schema activation χ consistency of items interaction was indeed 
significant (F(2,54)=5.36, ρ < .01, see Table 1 for means). Tests of simple 
main effects show that there were no significant differences between schema 
conditions for consistent items, while these differences were highly 
significant for inconsistent items (F(2,57)= 8.50, ρ < .001). Planned 
comparisons revealed that the recognition of schema-inconsistent items in 
the prior schema condition was clearly better than in the schema afterwards 
condition (F(l,57)=12.53, ρ < .001), indicating that schema activation leads to 
preferential encoding of schema-inconsistent information, thereby 
replicating earlier findings (Bodenhausen, 1988; Pyszczynski, LaPrelle & 
Greenberg, 1987; Wyer, Bodenhausen & Srull, 1984). Furthermore, 
recognition of schema-inconsistent under prior schema conditions was 
slightly better than in the no schema condition (F(l,57)=3.46, ρ < .07). In 
addition, the schema-inconsistent items were better recognized in the no 
schema condition than in the schema afterwards condition (F(l,57)=4.09, ρ < 
.05), which indicates that a posteriori schema activation results in 
deteriorated retrieval of inconsistent information. 
Table 1. Recognition of descriptively schema-consistent and -inconsistent 
behavioral descriptions (percentages). 
behavioral descriptions 
schema activation consistent inconsistent mean 
no schema 66.1 70.0 68.1 
schema afterwards 69.1 61.7 65.4 
prior schema 70.0 81.1 75.6 
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Within<ell comparisons revealed a better recognition of consistent 
information over inconsistent information in the schema afterwards 
condition (F(l,57)= 4.43, ρ < .04), while the reverse was true in the prior 
schema condition (F(l,57)= 6.13, ρ < .02). No difference between recognition 
of consistent and inconsistent information was found in the no schema 
control condition (F(l,57)= .26, n.s.). 
Recognition tasks may give rise to guessing biases. (Bellezza & Bower, 1981; 
Stangor & McMillan, 1992). For instance, subjects may have assigned 
behaviors to groups on the basis of the consistency of the behavior with the 
group. In order to circumvent potential bias effects in our recognition (or 
rather, allocation) task we used the sensitivity measure d', borrowed from 
signal detection theory (see, e.g. McNicoll, 1972). This measure, originally 
used as an index of signal-noise differentiation, may - when applied to item 
allocation to target groups - be interpreted as a measure of how well subjects 
are able to distinguish or differentiate correctly between the target groups. 
The advantage of d' compared to the above raw measure of correct 
allocation is that it is unaffected by allocation biases. 
Table 2. Signal-detection analysis: d'-scores. 
behavioral descriptions 
schema activation 
no schema 
schema afterwards 
prior schema 
consistent 
1.39 
1.73 
1.46 
inconsistent 
2.51 
1.49 
3.24 
The mean d'-scores are summarized in Table 2. First, there is a main 
effect of schema activation on d' (F (1,57)= 6.14, ρ < .02) revealing, on 
average, higher differentiation scores in the prior schema condition 
compared to the other conditions (particular compared to the schema 
afterwards condition). Although the interaction of schema activation by 
item consistency is only marginally significant (F (2,57)= 2.84, ρ < .07), the 
means in Table 2 show that the above main effect only holds for 
inconsistent items (F (2,57)= 3.69, ρ < .04) and not for consistent items (F 
(2,57)= .17, n.s.). It appears that a prior activated schema leads to better 
differentiation between target groups on inconsistent items, suggesting an 
encoding advantage for inconsistent items. Furthermore, a schema 
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afterwards seems to impair correct differentiation compared to the no 
schema control condition, suggesting a retrieval or recognition 
disadvantage for inconsistent items due to schema activation. On the 
whole, these results corroborate the analysis of correct recognition scores 
reported above. 
Discussion 
In line with several other experiments (e.g. Hastie & Kumar, 1979; 
Pyszczynski et al. 1987; Wyer et al. 1984) we obtained evidence for the idea 
that prior schema activation leads to preferential encoding of inconsistent 
information. Recognition of inconsistent information in the prior schema 
condition seemed indeed better than recognition of inconsistent 
information in the schema afterwards conditions. 
Results under conditions with a posteriori schema activation are 
interesting. While recognition of consistent information remained 
unaffected, the schema afterwards versus no schema manipulation strongly 
affected the recognition of schema-inconsistent information. When 
schémas were activated after the presentation of behavioral information, 
memory for schema-inconsistent information was substantially reduced 
compared to the control condition in which no schémas were evoked. 
The problem to be dealt with would be how this reduced recognition 
could be theoretically explained. First, it should be emphasized that 
encoding is the same for both the no schema and the schema afterwards 
condition. Because consistent and inconsistent information is not defined as 
such during encoding when no schémas are activated, there is no reason to 
assume that some information is encoded more thoroughly or more 
efficiently than other information. The results confirm this idea, as 
recognition in the no schema condition was virtually the same for schema-
consistent and schema-inconsistent information. Hence, what remains to be 
explained is why recognition of inconsistent information is obstructed by an 
a posteriori activated schema. 
To formulate a theoretical explanation is, considering the present 
literature, quite difficult. However, an explanation of inhibited access to 
inconsistent information in terms of associations among behaviors can be 
postulated. Srull and Wyer (1989; see also Hamilton, Driscoll & Worth, 1989; 
Hastie, 1980) assume that the processing of information without prior 
schema activation will result in a self generated representation. In this 
representation, behavioral descriptions are clustered in terms of trait-
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dimensions. Statements as "lends money to a friend" and "helps an old 
man crossing the street" may be clustered around the trait concept of 
"helpful". In a subsequent retrieval process the search in memory is guided 
by these trait concepts. In the no schema control condition, the recall 
probability of consistent information and inconsistent information is, 
theoretically, the same since (in)consistency is not defined in this condition. 
In case of a posteriori schema activation, some trait-behavior clusters will 
appear to be inconsistent with the schema. That is, if a given trait-behavior 
cluster only contains inconsistent behaviors, because no or very little 
consistent information with implications for the same trait is provided, this 
trait as such may be perceived as inconsistent with the schema. It may well 
be that access to this trait is inhibited by activating a conflicting schema. 
Because search in memory is guided by the traits represented in the schema, 
it may be assumed that the retrieval probability of inconsistent behaviors 
clustered in inconsistent traits is very low. This explanation is in line with 
the results of Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell & Kardes (1986). In their study, 
participants were asked to classify words with respect to their valence 
(positive versus negative). Three-hundred milliseconds before subjects were 
presented with these words, a positive or a negative attitude was primed. In 
comparison to control subjects who were not primed, subjects in the 
priming condition responded slower to words that were inconsistent with 
the primed attitude. In sum, attitudes may inhibit access to information that 
is inconsistent with this attitude. Our data may point, at a similar effect of 
stereotypes. 
In recent experiments (van Knippenberg & Dijksterhuis, 1996, 
Chapter 4), the phenomenon of inhibited access due to a posteriori schema 
activation, described in this article, is replicated in a free recall paradigm. Of 
course, inhibited access due to a posteriori schema activation requires 
further study. First, its robustness may be established by other replications in 
recognition as well as free recall paradigms. More importantly, further 
research may shed some light onto the nature of the underlying processes, 
particularly as regards the reorganization of information after a posteriori 
activated schémas and the effects of the latter on the search process. 
Notes 
1. This chapter was published as Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg (1995a). 
2. Relative group size was varied in order to study effects on illusory 
correlation. These effects are, however, not reported here. 
Stereotypes and memory 23 
Chapter 3 
Trait implications as a moderator of recall of stereotype-consistent 
and stereotype-inconsistent behaviors1 
The assumption was tested that organization in memory of 
behavioral information and recall depends on the descriptive relatedness of 
consistent information with inconsistent information. Subjects were 
provided with stereotype-consistent and stereotype-inconsistent behavioral 
descriptions implying the same trait dimension (e.g., intelligent and stupid 
behaviors) or different trait dimensions (e.g., intelligent and aggressive 
behaviors). It was hypothesized that in case stereotype-inconsistent 
behaviors would be associated with consistent behaviors because of shared 
trait implications, these behaviors would be recalled better than stereotype-
consistent behaviors. Conversely, it was expected that in case subjects were 
provided with inconsistent information that, because of differential trait 
implications, could not be associated with consistent information, this 
inconsistent information would be stored separately and recall of this 
information would be worse than recall of consistent information. These 
predictions were corroborated in a free recall task. Furthermore, conditional 
recall probabilities and ARC-scores provided support for the proposed 
underlying organization of information in memory. 
Our knowledge of the way in which people form impressions of 
persons and groups increased substantially during the past two decades (see 
e.g.. Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). Research on impression 
formation has been dominated by a debate on memory for consistent and 
inconsistent information, (e.g., Hastie & Kumar, 1979; Rothbart, Evans & 
Fulero, 1979; for reviews see Fyock & Stangor, 1994; Rojahn & Pettigrew, 
1992; Stangor & McMillan, 1992). In an influential study conducted by Hastie 
and Kumar, subjects were presented with a brief description of a person. 
This description consisted of a series of trait adjectives that were expected to 
create a strong initial impression. Subsequently subjects were asked to read a 
series of behavioral descriptions about the person. Some of these behaviors 
were consistent with the initial impression, some were inconsistent and 
some were irrelevant. Results obtained with a free recall task showed that 
inconsistent behaviors were recalled with a higher probability than 
consistent behaviors. 
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This effect, replicated many times (see the reviews mentioned above), 
is ascribed to differential encoding of consistent and inconsistent 
information. Consistent information is expected and is encoded without 
much effort. Inconsistent information however, is encoded more 
thoroughly because such behavior is unexpected (Crocker, Hannah & 
Weber, 1983). To incorporate inconsistent information in an impression, it 
is related to and compared with earlier encoded behaviors (Hamilton, 1988; 
Hastie, 1984; Sherman & Hamilton, 1994). This process of comparing 
inconsistent information with other, earlier encoded information, results in 
a high number of associative links between inconsistent information and 
other information. This, in tum, leads to superior recall of this information. 
The "effort explanation", that is, the idea that recall of inconsistent 
information is superior to that of consistent information due to more 
effortful encoding of inconsistent information, is supported by the finding 
that the memory advantage of inconsistent information dissappears when 
subjects are prevented from forming an impression during encoding, for 
instance, by increasing cognitive load, task complexity or processing pace 
(Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987; Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1995b; 
Macrae, Hewstone & Griffiths, 1993; Srull, 1981; Stangor & Duan, 1991). 
The theoretical explanation in terms of associative links formed 
during encoding has led to the development of more general associative 
network models for impression formation (e.g., Hamilton, Driscoll & 
Worth, 1989; Hastie, 1980; Srull, 1981; Srull & Wyer, 1989; Wyer & Srull, 
1989). In these models, the target person or group is represented by a node (a 
central person concept or a schema or stereotype). The behavioral 
information that is encoded is connected to this node, by which consistent 
behaviors are connected more strongly to the node than inconsistent 
information (Srull, 1981). Furthermore, all models posit that behavioral 
information is organized in memory with the help of trait dimensions. 
Behaviors with strong implications for the same trait are clustered together 
under the same trait dimension (e.g., Driscoll, 1992; Hamilton, Katz & 
Leirer, 1980a; 1980b; Hamilton, Driscoll & Worth, 1989; Hastie, 1980; Srull, 
1983; Srull & Wyer, 1989). These trait-behavior clusters may be conceived of 
as subnodes and are in turn associated with the central person concept (or 
the schema or stereotype). From associative network models some specific 
predictions concerning retrieval of consistent and inconsistent information 
may be derived. First, as argued above, the recall probability of inconsistent 
information is higher than the recall probability of consistent information, 
because inconsistent behaviors share more associative links with other 
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behaviors in a given trait-behavior cluster than do consistent behaviors. 
Second, the probability that a consistent behavior is retrieved from memory 
when the previously recalled behavior is also consistent is small, due to the 
absence of direct links between consistent behaviors. Given the recall of a 
consistent behavior, the probability that the next behavior to be recalled will 
be inconsistent is relatively high. Since inconsistent behaviors are 
connected with both consistent and inconsistent behaviors, the probability 
that an inconsistent behavior is followed by a consistent behavior is about 
the same as the probability of recalling another inconsistent behavior (Srull, 
1981). Third, the recall probability of a given behavior is higher when the 
previously recalled behavior was retrieved from the same cluster than 
when the previous recalled behavior emanated from a different cluster 
(Driscoll, 1992; Hamilton, Katz & Leirer, 1980a; Hamilton, Driscoll & Worth, 
1989). 
Associated and dissociated inconsistent information 
So far, we used the terms consistent and inconsistent to characterize 
the relation between an expectancy and a behavioral description. However, 
an inconsistent (or a consistent) behavior can be inconsistent (or consistent) 
in many respects. First, a behavior can be evaluatively inconsistent with a 
stereotype (or an expectancy). For instance, a member of a positively 
evaluated group performs negatively evaluated behavior. Second, an 
inconsistent behavior can be descriptively inconsistent with a stereotype. 
For example, a member of a group generally believed to be honest, may be 
observed to perform dishonest behavior. These different types of 
(in)consistency have received much attention in the literature (e.g., Hastie, 
1980; Srull & Wyer, 1989; Wyer, Bodenhausen & Srull, 1984; Wyer & 
Gordon, 1982; Wyer & Martin, 1986; Wyer & Srull, 1989; see also, Hamilton, 
Driscoll & Worth, 1989). 
However, we will focus on a third form of (in)consistency. 
Stereotype-inconsistent and stereotype-consistent behaviors (in an 
evaluative and descriptive sense) can have implications for the same trait 
dimension (e.g., intelligent and stupid behaviors). In this case, they are 
descriptively related, and therefore inconsistent with each other. 
Alternatively, consistent and inconsistent behaviors can have implications 
for different trait dimensions (e.g., intelligent and aggressive behaviors). 
Here, the behaviors are descriptively unrelated and not inconsistent with 
each other,. This distinction between descriptively unrelated and related 
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behaviors may well have implications for the underlying organization of 
inconsistent and consistent information in memory (and for the process of 
"inconsistency resolution", that is, the tendency to "explain away" 
inconsistent behaviors) and hence, for memory for consistent and 
inconsistent information2. 
Two concrete examples may clarify our argument. Note that in both 
examples, the inconsistent behavior is evaluatively as well as descriptively 
inconsistent with stereotypical expectations. First, imagine that, given that 
the stimulus group consists of professors known to perform intelligent 
behaviors (e.g., brilliant chess playing), you come across one who performed 
behavior suggesting lack of intelligence (e.g., very bad marks in high 
school). In this example, the consistent and inconsistent behaviors are 
related because they bear on the same trait-dimension: they are inconsistent 
with each other. This situation is likely to evoke efforts to explain the 
inconsistency (e.g., something in the school system that démotivâtes 
intelligent youngsters). As a result of explanatory efforts inconsistent 
behaviors which directly conflict with consistent information become 
strongly linked to the consistent behaviors in memory. Now consider an 
example of unrelated inconsistent behavior. Again, the stimulus group 
consists of professors, known to perform intelligent behaviors. Suppose one 
encounters a behavior that implies aggression (e.g., enjoys fighting in pubs). 
This may elicit a different encoding process. Of course, fighting in pubs is 
without doubt inconsistent with the stereotype of professors. However, it is 
not necessarily in contradiction with intelligence. In this case, inconsistent 
behaviors are still (evaluatively and descriptively) inconsistent with the 
stereotype, but they are not inconsistent with the consistent behaviors. 
Therefore, there is not much need to relate this inconsistent behavior to 
consistent behaviors. In sum, the probability that people engage in a process 
of inconsistency resolution ("explaining away" the occurence of inconsistent 
occurences) will be greater in the first case than in the second. 
As argued earlier, behaviors implying the same trait dimension seem 
to be stored together (Driscoll, 1992; Hamilton, Katz & Leirer, 1980a; 
Hamilton, Driscoll & Worth, 1989). In case consistent information and 
inconsistent information do share trait implications (that is, they are 
descriptively related), for instance, all consistent behaviors imply 
intelligence and all inconsistent behaviors imply stupidity, these behaviors 
are stored within the same trait-behavior cluster sharing many inter 
behavior associations. Here, inconsistent information is associated with 
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consistent information, resulting in a superior recall of inconsistent 
information over consistent information. 
However, when consistent and inconsistent information imply 
different trait dimensions, for instance, all consistent behaviors imply 
intelligence and all inconsistent behaviors imply aggressiveness, this 
information is stored separately. In other words, inconsistent information 
would then be dissociated from the cluster containing consistent behaviors. 
Here, retrieval would be guided by different trait-behavior clusters between 
which no interbehavior links exist (cf. Hamilton, Driscoll & Worth, 1989; 
Srull, 1983). Recall of inconsistent information may well be worse, as one 
might expect the consistent trait-behavior cluster (e.g., all intelligent 
behaviors), because of its consistency, to be associated more strongly with 
the central person concept or the stereotype than the inconsistent trait-
behavior cluster (e.g., all aggressive behaviors) 
The idea that the organization in memory and the recall of 
inconsistent behavioral information depends on the storage of this 
inconsistent information (associated vs dissociated) or, in other words, 
depends on the presence of consistent behaviors having implications for the 
same trait dimension, has not been empirically addressed sofar. Although 
in some studies a disctinction is made between single-trait and multi-trait 
impression formation (e.g., Driscoll, 1992; Hamilton, Driscoll & Worth, 
1989; Wyer & Gordon, 1982), these studies do not address the difference 
between associated and dissociated behaviors. In these experiments, under 
single-trait conditions subjects are presented with a stimulus set in which 
all behaviors are loaded on the same trait dimension (e.g., intelligent and 
stupid behaviors). Under multi-trait conditions, the stimulus set consists of 
different groups of behavioral descriptions that are loaded on different trait 
dimensions (e.g., intelligent and stupid behaviors, and friendly and 
unfriendly behaviors, and extroverted and introverted behaviors in the 
same stimulus set). However, in these studies, inconsistent information 
bearing on a certain trait dimension is always accompanied by consistent 
information loaded on the same dimension. Hence, the crucial difference 
between our study and the studies referred to above is that in the latter 
experiments stimulus conditions providing inconsistent behaviors not 
sharing trait implications with consistent behaviors (dissociated behaviors) 
are not incorporated. These studies address the difference between a 
relatively simple impression formation process (single-trait) and a more 
complex and more demanding impression formation process (multi-trait). 
However, these studies do not shed light on the way inconsistent 
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information not sharing trait-implications with consistent information is 
processed and retrieved. 
The purpose of the present study is to test the idea that the 
organization of behavioral information and subsequent recall of this 
information depends on the stimulus configuration in terms of trait 
dimensions. When inconsistent behaviors share trait implications with 
consistent behaviors (i.e. associated inconsistent behaviors) we expect this 
information to be stored under a single trait-behavior cluster and, therefore, 
to be recalled better. However, when inconsistent information does not 
share trait implications with consistent behaviors (i.e. dissociated 
inconsistent behaviors) we expect this inconsistent behaviors to be stored 
under a different trait-behavior cluster, separated from consistent behaviors 
and, therefore, to be recalled worse. 
To test these ideas, subjects were provided with behavioral 
descriptions about a social group. Consistent information presented to the 
subjects was under all experimental conditions evaluatively and 
descriptively consistent with the stereotype, while inconsistent behaviors 
were under all experimental conditions evaluatively and descriptively 
inconsistent with the stereotype. The crucial factor, then, is descriptive 
relatedness of the inconsistent information with the consistent 
information. After subjects read the behavioral descriptions, recall of 
consistent and inconsistent information was measured. Furthermore, 
conditional recall probabilities and ARC-scores (Adjusted Ratio of 
Clustering) were measured to shed light on the underlying organization in 
memory. Under conditions where behaviors are dissociated, recall 
probabilities are expected to reveal storage in different trait-behavior clusters 
(cf. Hamilton, Driscoll & Worth, 1989). In concrete terms we expect the 
probability that a consistent behavior will be followed by another consistent 
behavior (C-C) and the probability that an inconsistent behavior will be 
followed by another inconsistent behavior (I-I) to be greater under two-trait 
conditions than under one-trait conditions, (because direct links between 
consistent and inconsistent behaviors are supposed to be absent under two-
trait conditions, which should lead to relatively high C-C and I-I 
probabilities). In terms of ARC-scores, we expect consistent information on 
the one hand and inconsistent information on the other hand, to be 
clustered to a higher degree under conditions where behaviors are 
Stereotypes and memory 29 
dissociated (two-trait) compared to conditions under which behaviors are 
associated (one-trait). 
Method 
Subjects and Design 
Forty-eight undergraduate students from the University of Nijmegen 
were randomly assigned to the cells of a 2 (number of trait dimensions in 
the stimulus material: 1- consistent and inconsistent information loaded on 
the same trait dimension vs 2- consistent and inconsistent information 
loaded on different dimensions) χ 2 (target: soccer-hooligans vs professors) χ 
2 (stimulus set: the aggressive/peaceloving set vs the intelligent/stupid set 
under one-trait conditions and the aggressive/intelligent set vs the 
stupid/peaceloving set under two-trait conditions)3 between-subjects 
design. In Table 1 a schematic overview of the design is provided. Subjects 
received Dfl. 5 (approx. 3 US$) for participating. 
Pretesting of stimulus materials 
Thirty-three subjects (other than the experimental subjects) rated 
fourteen social groups on fourteen trait dimensions. Nine-point scales were 
used with poles labeled "members of this group are not at all...(l)" and 
"members of this group are very...(9)". To avoid a valence-consistency 
confounding (e.g., because of possible positive-negative asymmetries, see 
e.g., Ikegami, 1993; Reeder & Brewer, 1979; Skowronski & Carlston, 1987; 
Vonk, 1993), two groups were selected with opposite scores. This way, we 
were able to construct stimulus sets in which both consistent and 
inconsistent behaviors could be either positive or negative. Professors were 
perceived as intelligent (M=7.79), as peaceloving (M=7.12), and as not stupid 
(M=1.81) and not aggressive (M=2.98) and hooligans were perceived as 
aggressive (M=8.75), as stupid (M=7.85), and as not peaceloving (M=1.50) and 
not intelligent (M=1.87). Therefore, we chose the dimensions "intelligent-
stupid" and "aggressive-peaceloving". Subsequently, forty other subjects 
rated 98 behaviors on intelligence, stupidity, peacelovingness and 
aggressiveness. Nine-point scales were used with poles labeled "performing 
this behavior is not at all (e.g., intelligent) (1)" and "performing this 
behavior is very (e.g., intelligent) (9)". Thirty behaviors were selected of 
which 6 were intelligent, 6 were stupid, 6 were aggressive, 6 were 
peaceloving and 6 were irrelevant. Behaviors that were loaded on one trait 
dimension, were neutral with respect to the other trait dimension (see Table 
2 for means). 
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Table 1. Design of the experiment. 
Target: 
Professor Soccer-hooligan 
Behavior: consistent/inconsistent consistent/inconsistent 
Number of traits: 
1 trait 
in stimulus 
material 
(descriptively 
related) 
2 traits 
in stimulus 
material 
(descriptively 
unrelated) 
intelligent/stupid 
(stimulus set 1) 
stupid/intelligent 
(stimulus set 1) 
peaceloving/aggressive aggressive/peaceloving 
(stimulus set 2) (stimulus set 2) 
intelligent /aggressive 
(stimulus set 3) 
peaceloving/stupid 
(stimulus set 4) 
aggressive / intelligent 
(stimulus set 3) 
stupid /peaceloving 
(stimulus set 4) 
Four stimulus sets were constructed with 6 consistent descriptions, 6 
inconsistent descriptions and (for all sets the same) 6 neutral filler-items. In 
two sets, consistent and inconsistent behaviors had implications for the 
same trait dimension (either intelligent and stupid behaviors, or aggressive 
and peaceloving behaviors). In the two remaining sets, consistent and 
inconsistent behaviors were loaded on different dimensions (intelligent and 
aggressive behaviors, stupid and peaceloving behaviors). The design is a 2 
(target: professors vs soccer-hooligans) χ 2 (number of traits: 1 vs 2) χ 2 
(stimulus set) design, with 'stimulus set' nested under 'number of traits'. 
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Table 2. Stimulus material (ratings on nine-point scales ranging form 1 to 9) 
intelligence stupidity aggressiv. peacelovingness 
intelligent items 
stupid items 
aggressive items 
peaceloving items 
fillers 
7.12 
2.98 
4.41 
5.45 
5.06 
2.12 
7.17 
6.06 
4.13 
4.72 
4.32 
5.16 
7.36 
2.72 
4.96 
5.95 
4.23 
2.37 
7.25 
4.61 
Procedure 
Subjects attended the experiment in groups up to 7 persons per 
session. They were placed in individual cubicles containing an Apple 
Macintosh computer, which was used to provide all information 
concerning the experiment. They were asked to read a series of behavioral 
descriptions about members of a group of professors (or soccer-hooligans) 
and to form an impression of this group. Subjects did not know in advance 
that they would be presented with a free recall task. All descriptions were 
accompanied by different first names. In all conditions, the first two items as 
well as the last two items to appear on the screen, were fillers. All other 
items were presented in random order and subjects were allowed to read the 
behaviors in their own pace. After completion of the reading task and after a 
one-minute break, subjects were presented with a free recall task. 
Subsequently subjects were thanked, paid and debriefed. 
Dependent variables 
After reading the behavioral information, subjects were asked to 
write down as many of the behavioral descriptions as possible. They were 
given six minutes to complete this task. These free recall data were also used 
to calculate conditional recall probabilities. 
Results 
Recall 
In case inconsistent behaviors share trait implications with consistent 
behaviors we expect this information to be recalled better than consistent 
information, because the inconsistent information is associated, that is, all 
information is stored under a single trait-behavior cluster. In case 
inconsistent information does not share trait implications with consistent 
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behaviors we expect this inconsistent behaviors to be stored under a 
different trait-behavior cluster, dissociated from consistent behaviors and, 
therefore, to be recalled worse in comparison to consistent information. 
Since the order of presentation of the irrelevant filler items was not 
random (see Procedure), data of these fillers are not included in our 
analyses, simply because one cannot compare these data with the data on 
consistent and inconsistent behavioral descriptions. 
The number of correctly recalled consistent and inconsistent 
descriptions were counted for each subject. An item was counted as correct if 
the general meaning of the original item was reflected (cf. Gordon & Wyer, 
1987; Hastie & Kumar, 1979; Srull, 1981; 1983). Subsequently, the number of 
correctly recalled consistent and inconsistent items was divided by the 
number of that type of item in the stimulus set (i.e. a proportion of .50 for 
recall of consistent information indicates that 3 out of the original 6 
consistent behaviors were recalled). The resulting proportions were 
subjected to a 2 (number of traits in the stimulus material) χ 2 (target) χ 2 
(stimulus set, nested under number of traits) between-subjects χ 2 (type of 
behavioral description) within-subjects ANOVA. We obtained an 
interaction of number of traits with type of behavioral description (F (1,40)= 
12,46, ρ < .002). As expected, associated inconsistent behaviors (i.e. 
inconsistent behaviors under one-trait conditions) were recalled better than 
consistent behaviors (F (1,40)= 8.55, ρ < .01), while the reverse effect was 
obtained for dissociated behaviors (F (1,40)= 4.70, ρ < .04, see Table 3 for 
means). No other main effects or interactions were found. None of the 
interactions indicating differential effects for target (professor vs soccer-
hooligan) were reliable, and neither were the nested stimulus set effects (cf. 
Winer, 1970, ρ .185). 
Table 3. Recall (percentages). 
consistent inconsistent 
1 trait 46.4 62.3 
2 traits 60.0 48.7 
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Conditional recall probabilities and clustering 
Conditional recall probabilities were calculated to examine 
organization in memory. We predicted that the probability that a certain 
behavior will be recalled is higher when the previously recalled description 
is stored under the same trait-behavior cluster (cf. Hamilton, Driscoll & 
Worth, 1989; Srull, 1983). Under conditions in which the information is 
stored under two separate clusters, the recall data should show higher 
probabilities of consistent items following consistent items (C-C) and 
inconsistent items following inconsistent items (I-I) than under conditions 
where the information was clustered under a single cluster. 
Table 4 . Conditional recall probabilities (C=consistent, I=inconsistent) 
previous behavior С I 
subsequent behavior C I C I 
1 trait .17 .42 .39 .31 
2 traits .49 .30 .23 .51 
The results of 2 subjects could not be analyzed, because one or more 
inter-item sequences did not occur in their recall protocols. Data of the 
remaining participants were subjected to a 2 (number of traits in the 
stimulus material) χ 2 (target) χ 2 (stimulus set, nested under number of 
traits) berween-subjects χ 2 (previous item: consistent vs inconsistent) χ 2 
(subsequent item: consistent vs inconsistent) within-subjects ANOVA 
which resulted in a 3-way interaction of number of traits χ previous item χ 
subsequent item (F (1,38) = 14.76, ρ < .001). The cell means are shown in 
Table 4. As expected, under conditions with two trait dimensions, C-C and I-
I probabilities were higher than under one-trait conditions (for C-C, F (4,35)= 
14.95, ρ < .001; for I-I, F (4,35)= 5.75, ρ < .03). Again, no reliable effects were 
obtained that indicated differential effects for different targets or for different 
stimulus sets. 
ARC-scores 
Despite the fact that conditional probabilities are informative about 
the underlying representation of information in memory, they cannot 
simply be interpreted as clustering scores. Therefore, we used the recall data 
to calculate ARC-scores as well. Two ARC-scores were computed for each 
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subject, one representing the degree of clustering of consistent items and 
one representing the degree of clustering of inconsistent items. These two 
scores were subjected to a 2 (number of traits in the stimulus material) χ 2 
(target) χ 2 (stimulus set, nested under number of traits) between-subjects χ 2 
(ARCcon vs ARCinc) within-subjects ANOVA. As predicted, a main effect 
of number of traits was obtained. Consistent information and inconsistent 
information was clustered to a higher degree under two-trait conditions 
(ARCcon= .21 and ARCinc= .28) than under one-trait conditions (ARCcon= 
.16 and ARCinc= .01; F (1,40)= 6.76, ρ < .02). No other effects were obtained. 
Discussion 
In line with earlier research (e.g., Hamilton, Driscoll & Worth, 1989; 
Hastie, 1984), the present results suggest that the way stereotype-related 
behavioral information is organized in memory in terms of trait-behavior 
clusters does affect recall. On the basis of pre-test results a distinction was 
made between stereotype-consistent and stereotype-inconsistent behaviors 
bearing on the same trait at the one hand (descriptively related, such as 
intelligent and stupid behaviors), and stereotype-consistent and stereotype-
inconsistent behaviors having implications for different traits at the other 
hand (descriptively unrelated, such as intelligent and aggressive behaviors). 
As predicted, it was found that inconsistent information that, presumably, 
became associated with consistent information during encoding because of 
shared trait implications was significantly better recalled than consistent 
information. Conversely, recall of dissociated inconsistent information, that 
is stereotype-inconsistent information not linked to consistent information 
due to different trait implications, was significantly worse than recall of 
consistent information. Trait-behavior clustering of social information thus 
seems to moderate recall of behavioral information. 
When subjects are provided with stereotype-consistent and 
stereotype-inconsistent behavioral information with implications for 
different trait dimensions, inconsistent behaviors are assumed not to be 
associated with consistent behaviors and to be stored separately under a 
different trait-behavior cluster. Behaviors will only be directly linked with 
other behavioral information in the same trait-behavioral cluster and not 
with behaviors in a different trait-behavior cluster. Assuming that retrieval 
is guided by these clusters (cf. Hamilton, Driscoll & Worth, 1989) it was 
predicted that the probability that a consistent behavior will be followed by 
another consistent behavior (C-C) and the probability that an inconsistent 
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behavior will be followed by another inconsistent behavior (I-I) will be 
greater under two-trait conditions than under one-trait conditions. The 
results confirmed this prediction. Moreover, ARC-scores revealed greater 
clustering of consistent items and inconsistent behaviors under two-trait 
conditions compared to one-trait conditions. 
The obtained pattern of recall and conditional recall probabilities 
permits a more precise formulation of the conditions under which 
"inconsistency resolution" takes place. Wyer and Srull (1989; see also Srull 
& Wyer, 1989) argued that when people engage in a process of inconsistency 
resolution (i.e. the attempt to reconcile apparently incompatible behaviors), 
priority is given to behaviors that are descriptively inconsistent with the 
expectancy over behaviors that are only evaluatively inconsistent with the 
expectancy. Our data suggest a third determinant of inconsistency 
resolution. Since superior recall of inconsistent items was only observed in 
the one-trait condition, it seems that inconsistency resolution occurs only 
(or at least to a higher degree) when the behaviors involved have 
conflicting implications for the same trait. 
Apparently, interbehavior inconsistencies require inconsistency 
resolution, while mere stereotype-inconsistencies do not or to a lesser 
extent. For instance, take a group of soccer hooligans of which several 
aggressive behaviors have been presented (e.g., intimidating other people). 
Now, a particular hooligan does something rather peaceloving (e.g., tries to 
withhold his friends from starting a fight in the stadium). Subjects may 
want to resolve this inconsistency by contemplating plausible explanations 
(e.g., maybe normally he would have loved a fight, but now he brought his 
younger sister to the stadium, see e.g., Vonk, 1994). This attempt to reconcile 
interbehavior inconsistencies probably leads to the establishment of 
interbehavior links in memory resulting in a memory advantage of the 
inconsistent behaviors. Alternatively, given the same group of aggressive 
soccer hooligans, suppose subjects come across stereotype-inconsistent 
behaviors unrelated to aggressiveness (e.g., speaks four different languages). 
Although unexpected, these behaviors as such are not incompatible with 
aggressiveness and, therefore, they may not trigger inconsistency resolution. 
The resulting lack of association with consistent behaviors in memory may, 
despite the fact that the behaviors involved are stereotype-inconsistent, 
explain the observed memory-disadvantage of unrelated inconsistent 
information. 
It may appear somewhat surprising that we obtained a memory-
advantage for inconsistent behaviors over consistent information under 
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one-trait conditions. The usual finding in group perception is that 
consistent information is recalled with a higher probability than 
inconsistent information (see Fyock & Stangor, 1994, for a review). In 
research in which person perception and group perception are studied in a 
single experiment, results are sometimes virtually the same (Dijksterhuis & 
van Knippenberg, 1995b, Chapter 4; Srull, Lichtenstein & Rothbart, 1985) 
but, more often, strikingly different (e.g., Stem, Marrs, Millar & Cole, 1984; 
Wyer, Bodenhausen & Srull, 1984). However, there may be several reasons 
for the fact that a memory advantage for inconsistent information is 
obtained here. First, our stimulus set was small (18 behaviors). As Stangor & 
Ruble (1989) pointed out, increasing the set also increases the relative recall 
advantage for consistent information, presumably because (stereotypical) 
expectancies play a more pronounced role during encoding when cognitive 
load is high (see also Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987; Dijksterhuis & van 
Knippenberg, 1995b; Dijksterhuis, van Knippenberg, Kruglanski, Schaper, 
1996; Macrae & Dijksterhuis, 1996; Macrae, Hewstone & Griffiths, 1993; 
Stangor & Duan, 1991). Moreover, subjects were allowed to process the 
information in their own pace. This also contributes to the fact that 
cognitive demands were extremely low in comparison to most studies using 
this paradigm. This low processing load is indicated by the overall recall of 
about 50% and may explain the fact that inconsistent information could be 
given enough attention to result in a high level of recall of this 
information. 
Whether or not the reported results are generalizable to person 
perception remains unclear. However, some educated guesses can be made. 
Imagine a professor performing intelligent and aggressive behaviors at the 
same time. Although aggressive behaviors are unexpected, they may be 
thought of the same way as if these behaviors were performed by another 
person. An aggressive professor may conflict with stereotypical expectations, 
it does not necessarily conflict with the fact that this person seems to be 
intelligent as well. 
Now imagine a particular professor performing both stupid and 
intelligent behaviors. Here, it seems plausible that the need to explain the 
occurrence of the inconsistent stupid behavior is even greater than when 
the different behaviors were performed by different people, simply because 
the contradiction may be more apparent. In a recent series of experiments, 
Vonk and van Knippenberg (1995) obtained empirical evidence for the 
differential effects of "within-person inconsistencies" and "within-group 
inconsistencies". In their studies, processing within-person inconsistencies 
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took more time than processing within-group inconsistencies, indicating 
that within-person inconsistencies were elaborated more thoroughly than 
within-group inconsistencies. This thorough elaboration of within-person 
inconsistencies may be due to the fact people's concept of a person is 
essentially more homogeneous, and allows for less contradictions, than that 
of a group. Therefore, one may expect our findings to be generalizable to 
person perception and, because within-person inconsistencies may be more 
apparent than within-group inconsistencies, the effect may even be more 
pronounced. 
Notes 
1. This chapter was published as Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg (1996a). 
2. Obviously, different behaviors can also be evaluatively consistent or 
inconsistent with each other. This issue is not discussed in the present 
study. Note, however, that when we vary descriptive inter-behavior 
consistency, evaluatively consistency is kept constant. 
3. Of necessity, the factor 'stimulus set' is nested under the factor 'number 
of trait dimension'. 
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Chapter 4 
A posteriori stereotype activation: the preservation of stereotypes 
through memory distortion1 
Four experiments investigated memory for stereotype-consistent and 
stereotype-inconsistent information after a posteriori stereotype activation. 
In experiment 1, it was established that, in comparison with a no stereotype 
control condition, recall of stereotype-inconsistent behaviors of group 
members deteriorated after a posteriori stereotype activation, while recall of 
stereotype-consistent information was not affected. An explanation of this 
phenomenon in terms of the memory organization of behaviors in trait-
behavior clusters was tested in experiment 2. The results of experiment 2 
suggest that recall of stereotype-inconsistent behaviors suffered from a 
stereotype activated afterwards when they were stored in a separate trait, i.e., 
not linked to stereotype-consistent behaviors, while stereotype-inconsistent 
information that was linked to stereotype-consistent information did not. In 
experiment 3 the same partem of results was obtained when an a posteriori 
stereotype was activated using an 'unrelated prime', i.e., the stereotype did 
not pertain to information presented earlier, suggesting the operation of 
involuntary, nonconscious processes in deteriorated recall of stereotype-
inconsistent information. Finally, the results of experiment 4 provide 
evidence for the idea that the impaired recall of stereotype-inconsistent 
information may be, at least partly, ascribed to suppressed access to 
stereotype-inconsistent traits due to a posteriori stereotype activation. 
In the literature on stereotype activation and memory, relatively little 
attention has been paid to the influence of an activated stereotype on recall 
of earlier endoded information. In their well-known 'Betty К study', Snyder 
and Uranowitz (1978) suggested that a stereotype presented after encoding 
elicits a subjective 'reconstruction' of initially encoded information. They 
reported superior recognition of 'heterosexual' information under 
conditions in which Betty К was later said to be heterosexual compared to 
conditions in which Betty К was said to be a lesbian. Clark and Woll (1981), 
however, found no such consistency advantage in similar experiments. 
Rothbart, Evans and Fulero (1979) and Cohen (1981) also studied the 
effects of a posteriori stereotype activation. The recall data of Rothbart et al. 
(1979) revealed no significant difference between memory for expected and 
'not-expected' behaviors. Their 'not-expected' behaviors, however, cannot 
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simply be regarded as inconsistent. In Cohen's (1981) study, subjects watched 
a videotape in which a woman performed stereotype-consistent and 
stereotype-inconsistent behaviors. Under conditions in which the stereotype 
was activated after the subjects watched the videotape, subjects were able to 
recognize more stereotype-consistent behaviors than stereotype-inconsistent 
behaviors. Later, similar findings were reported in a number of other 
studies in which both recognition and free recall paradigms were used (Hirt, 
Erickson & McDonald, 1993; Pyszczynski, LaPrelle & Greenberg, 1987; Wyer, 
Bodenhausen & Srull, 1984; Wyer & Martin, 1986; but see Bellezza & Bower, 
1981; Clark & Woll, 1981; see, for a review, Rojahn & Pettigrew, 1992). 
How does an a posteriori stereotype affect memory? 
The general picture that emerges from most of the studies cited above 
is that, compared to prior stereotype activation, the activation of an a 
posteriori stereotype impedes recall of stereotype-inconsistent information, 
while recall of stereotype-consistent information is not affected. As it stands, 
however, the processes underlying a posteriori stereotype effects on recall do 
not seem to be well understood. 
Pyszczynski et al. suggested that an a posteriori activated stereotype 
might function as a retrieval cue (for a similar argument, see Srull & Wyer, 
1989; Wyer, Bodenhausen & Srull, 1984). The postulated retrieval cue 
mechanism may operate as follows. An a posteriori activated stereotype is 
supposed to elicit a memory search guided by stereotypical expectations. 
This would lead the search in stereotype-consistent directions, while at the 
same time this expectancy-guided search would misdirect or distract the 
search away from stereotype-inconsistent information, reducing the chance 
of recall of stereotype-inconsistent behaviors. Since this prediction was 
sustained, the retrieval cue explanation seems to be corroborated. 
On closer examination, however, some questions arise that are hard 
to tackle within Pyszczynski et al.'s experimental design. As argued by 
Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg (1995a, Chapter 2), the comparison 
between a priori and a posteriori stereotype activation may be more 
indicative of encoding than of retrieval effects. Assuming that a priori 
stereotype activation affects both encoding (i.e., the on-line processing and 
storage of information in memory) and retrieval (assuming that during the 
free recall task the stereotype was still activated), while stereotype activation 
afterwards only affects retrieval, the contrast between the two conditions 
would seem to be informative of differential encoding effects, and not of 
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differential retrieval. In other words, the better recall of stereotype-
inconsistent information in the prior activation condition, compared to the 
stereotype-afterwards condition, most likely reflects an encoding advantage 
of stereotype-inconsistent information due to prior stereotype activation 
(see Rojahn & Pettigrew, 1992; Stangor & McMillan, 1992). Hence, to what 
extent a posteriori activated stereotypes serve as retrieval cues still remains 
somewhat in the dark. 
Pure retrieval cue effects of a posteriori activated stereotypes may be 
revealed when one compares the effects on memory of a stereotype 
activated after subjects have been presented with behavioral information 
with a condition in which the same behavioral information is presented 
without mentioning the stereotype at all (i.e., a no stereotype control 
condition). In such a comparison there would be no encoding difference 
(because the two conditions are identical at this stage), and only the retrieval 
circumstances would vary. 
Recently, Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg (1995a, Chapter 2) 
reported an experiment in which, using a recognition paradigm, an a 
posteriori stereotype condition was compared with a no stereotype control 
condition. In their experiment, subjects were provided with behavioral 
information about two social groups. Under conditions in which the groups 
were labelled (as environmental activists or professional soldiers) after 
encoding, recognition of stereotype-consistent information was superior to 
recognition of stereotype-inconsistent information (as was the case in many 
of the cited studies). The comparison of the a posteriori stereotype activation 
condition with the no stereotype control condition showed a recognition 
decrease of stereotype-inconsistent behaviors due to afterwards stereotype 
activation, and no effect at all on the stereotype-consistent behaviors. 
Although Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg (1995a, Chapter 2) 
avoided encoding differences between conditions, the fact that they used a 
recognition paradigm (or, rather, a paradigm in which earlier presented 
behaviors had to be allocated to one of two groups), renders their study 
somewhat inconclusive as regards the retrieval cue function of a posteriori 
stereotypes. Active memory search is probably more crucial in free recall 
than in recognition (although retrieval processes may operate in 
recognition, see, e.g., Mandler, 1980). Furthermore, as argued by Bellezza 
and Bower (1981; see also Stangor & McMillan, 1992), recognition paradigms 
(or, as in this case, 'allocation' paradigms') may be subject to guessing biases. 
That is, if subjects have to allocate a behavior to a group (or to one of two 
groups), they may not really remember whether or not they have seen it as 
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being associated with that group, but rely on stereotype-inconsistency in 
their decision not to allocate. 
Considering these weaknesses of this study with regard to 
understanding the effects of a posteriori stereotypes on retrieval, a free recall 
paradigm would be more appropriate. Furthermore, as we envisage to 
present a theoretical explanation for the deteriorated recall phenomenon, it 
seems worthwhile to demonstrate its robustness. Therefore, in experiment 1 
we replicate Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg's (1995a; Chapter 2) design 
while using a free recall task to assess memory. The results of this study 
show that recall of stereotype-inconsistent behavior deteriorated due to a 
posteriori stereotype activation, while recall of stereotype-consistent 
behaviors remained unaffected, which replicates earlier findings. In sum, it 
seems indeed that the a posteriori activated stereotype somehow deflects the 
memory search away from earlier encoded stereotype-inconsistent 
information. The question is, how? 
In order to account for the observed impeded recall of stereotype-
inconsistent behaviors due to a posteriori stereotype activation, we have 
further elaborated on the idea that stereotypes may serve as retrieval cues. 
The basic tenet of the proposed 'guided search' or 'guided retrieval' 
explanation is that traits attributed to a group (or person) guide the memory 
search in the direction of trait-related behavior. An activated stereotype may 
lead the search in the direction of some (i.e., stereotype-consistent) traits and 
distract the search away from other (i.e., stereotype-inconsistent) traits. As 
our approach entails assumptions concerning the organization of 
behavioral information in memory, we will first expand on the presumed 
trait-behavior clustering in encoding and storage of social information, and 
subsequently elaborate on how this memory organization may affect 
retrieval. 
The organization of behavioral information in memory 
Traits play a major role in social perception. Upon observing the 
behaviors of others, we may often, when trying to make sense of these 
behaviors, encode them in terms of underlying traits (see e.g., Gilbert & 
Malone, 1995; Gilbert, Pelham & Krull, 1988). In fact, upon perceiving overt 
behavior we may infer the .underlying trait spontaneously and 
unconsciously (Carlston & Skowronski, 1995; Newman & Uleman, 1989; 
Uleman, 1987; Winter & Uleman, 1984; Winter, Uleman & Cunniff, 1985). 
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If trait implications may be spontaneously invoked during encoding, 
it is conceivable that traits also play a role in the storage of information in 
memory. The person memory literature indeed suggests that traits are used 
to organize behavioral information in memory. When people are forming 
impressions, behavioral information may be clustered in memory with the 
help of trait dimensions (e.g., Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1996a, 
Chapter 3; Driscoll, 1992; Gordon & Wyer, 1987; Hamilton, Driscoll & 
Worth, 1989; Hastie, 1980; Srull & Wyer, 1989; Wyer, Bodenhausen & Srull, 
1984). For example, behaviors such as "he kicked the cat" an "he wrecked a 
telephone booth" may be stored together under the trait concept 
"aggressive". Other behaviors, like for instance "he recited a sonnet of 
Shakespeare by heart" and "he explained quantum theory to his girlfriend" 
may be stored under another trait concept, say intelligent. Theoretically, 
such behavior-trait clusterings may be understood as groupings in memory 
of behavioral items having between-item associations as well as item-trait 
associations which may facilitate subsequent recall of the clustered items 
(e.g., Gordon & Wyer, 1987; Hamilton, Katz & Leirer, 1980a; Srull, 1983). 
The role of traits and stereotypes in guided retrieval 
Imagine that you observe behaviors displayed by members of a group 
(or by a person). Some of these behaviors imply intelligence, while others 
imply aggressiveness. As suggested above, these behaviors are presumably 
stored separately in two different trait-behavior clusters. A schematic model 
of the assumed underlying representation is depicted in Figure la. 
A guided retrieval conception of recall of behavioral information 
would suggest that, when no stereotype is activated at all (i.e., in a no 
stereotype control condition), the memory search is guided by the subject's 
knowledge that the stimulus group (or person) is both intelligent and 
aggressive2, as a consequence of which the subject may actively try to 
retrieve instances of intelligent and aggressive behaviors from memory. 
The solid lines in Figure la indicate the routes through which the search 
process would evolve. In this situation the probability of retrieval would be 
equal for the two types of behaviors. 
However, if a stereotype is activated after the information is encoded, 
a different process may unroll. Suppose the subject learns that the behaviors 
were all performed by college professors. As a consequence, some behaviors 
become stereotype-consistent (the intelligent ones) and some others become 
stereotype-inconsistent (the aggressive ones). In this situation, a guided 
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search approach assumes that the activated stereotype affects the mental 
representation of the stimulus group (or person) in the sense that, in the 
present example, the association with the trait intelligent would be 
strengthened, while the association with the trait aggressive may be 
weakened. To the extent, then, that the stereotype guides retrieval, the 
search would preferentially be directed towards retrieving instances of 
intelligent behavior, while it would by the same token misdirect the search 
away from the stereotype-inconsistent behaviors, reducing the probability of 
recall of the latter. Figure lb schematically depicts the search avenues in the 
case of a posteriori stereotype activation. 
Figure 1. Schematic representation under two trait-conditions before (a) and 
after (b) stereotype activation. Solid lines indicate high probabilities of 
retrieving information, while dotted lines indicate low probabilities. For 
simplicity, inter-behavior associations are neglected. 
Figure la. Figure lb. 
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It is worth noting at this stage that the preferential search for 
stereotype-consistent behaviors need not lead to their enhanced recall 
compared to the control condition because, as we argued above, in the 
control condition the memory search would be trait-guided as well. Hence, 
the guided retrieval explanation would account for the reduced recall of 
stereotype-inconsistent information due to a posteriori stereotype 
activation, as well as for the absence of an effect on stereotype-consistent 
information. 
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This explanation in terms of trait-guided retrieval implies that recall 
of stereotype-inconsistent behaviors suffers from a posteriori stereotype 
activation only if these stereotype-inconsistent behaviors are stored under a 
different trait concept than the stereotype-consistent ones. If stereotype-
consistent and stereotype-inconsistent behaviors are stored under the same 
(stereotype-consistent) trait, a posteriori stereotype activation is not expected 
to lead to reduced recall of stereotype-inconsistent information. Some recent 
research not only shows that behaviors are clustered in memory in terms of 
traits, but also that behaviors having opposite implications for the same 
trait dimension (e.g., intelligent and stupid behaviors) are stored under the 
same trait-behavior cluster (Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1996a, 
Chapter 3; Hamilton, Driscoll & Worth, 1989). In this situation stereotype-
consistent and stereotype-inconsistent behaviors would become associated 
with the same stereotype-consistent trait (e.g., intelligence) and presumably 
consistent-inconsistent inter-behavior associations would be formed as well. 
One may therefore expect that, in this case, stereotype-consistent and 
stereotype-inconsistent behaviors will be recalled equally well in the no 
stereotype control condition (see Figure 2a) and in the a posteriori stereotype 
condition (see Figure 2b). 
Figure 2. Schematic model of the representation in memory under one-trait 
condition before (a) and after (b) stereotype activation. C's represent 
consistent behaviors, I's represent inconsistent behaviors and B's represent 
behaviors of which (in)consistency is not yet defined. Again, inter-behavior 
associations are neglected in these figures. 
Figure 2a. Figure 2b. 
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Hence, on the basis of a guided retrieval model, we predict that 
deteriorated recall of stereotype-inconsistent behaviors due to a posteriori 
stereotype activation only occurs when stereotype-consistent and stereotype-
inconsistent behaviors bear on different trait concepts (e.g., intelligent and 
aggressive), and not when they pertain to the same stereotype-consistent 
trait (e.g., intelligent). This prediction is tested in experiment 2. In 
agreement with our present argument, the results show that, compared to a 
no stereotype control condition, recall of stereotype-inconsistent behaviors 
suffers from a posteriori stereotype activation only when they bear on a 
different trait than the stereotype-consistent behaviors, while there is no 
deteriorated recall when they load on the same trait dimension. 
Furthermore, clustering data seem to corroborate the presumed underlying 
memory organization in terms of the same versus separate traits. 
Cognitive processes operating in guided retrieval 
As regards the precise nature of the guided search process, some 
pertinent questions remain. Is it a conscious and deliberate search strategy? 
A conscious search strategy would require the subjects to be aware of the fact 
that what they are asked to recall either pertains to an intelligent and 
aggressive group (that is, in the control condition), or to (e.g.) a group of 
professors (in the a posteriori stereotype condition) to whom they attribute 
the trait intelligent (and not the trait aggressive). For the strategy to be 
deliberate, subjects should intentionally try to retrieve trait-related 
behaviors. That is, their memory search might be characterized by voluntary 
contemplations, such as, for instance, "So this was a group of professors. Let 
me think, which intelligent behaviors did I see?" In such an intentional 
search strategy, subjects might even discard retrieved stereotype-
inconsistent behaviors as inappropriate or unlikely to be true considering 
the nature of the stimulus group. 
Conversely, the influence of the stereotype on recall may be 
unintentional and even nonconscious. Even without the subject's 
voluntary control or awareness of the nature of the search process, the 
activation of the professor stereotype may simply activate the trait 
intelligent, or enhance its accessibility, as a result of which the stored 
intelligence-related behaviors come to mind more easily than aggression-
related behaviors. Experiment 3 was designed to see whether deteriorated 
recall of stereotype-inconsistent behaviors would still be observed when the 
a posteriori stereotype activation was brought about by an 'unrelated prime', 
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i.e. a task in which, prior to the recall task, subjects were asked, allegedly to 
help out a colleague of the experimenter, to think about (e.g.) a typical 
professor and to write down attributes of his or her lifestyle and appearance. 
The results of experiment 3 showed deteriorated recall of stereotype-
inconsistent behaviors due to a posteriori stereotype activation, again only 
when it was stored in a separate stereotype-inconsistent trait. Thus, even 
when the activated stereotype does not pertain to the stimulus group (at 
least, there were no signs in the debriefing that subjects saw it that way), it 
leads to reduced recall of stereotype-inconsistent information stored in a 
separate trait-behavior cluster (as indicated by the clustering data). These 
results suggest that the influence of an a posteriori activated stereotype on 
recall is unintentional and probably nonconscious. 
The role of facilitated and inhibited access 
There is one final issue that needs further clarification. How exactly 
does a stereotype 'guide' memory search? One mechanism already 
suggested in our argument sofar is that stereotype-consistent traits are 
activated, or become more accessible, by the mere activation of the 
stereotype. For instance, the label professor may trigger the activation of the 
trait concept intelligent (as it may also trigger other, less flattering, traits). As 
a result of the activation of the trait intelligent, subjects may 
unintentionally search for instances of intelligence-related behaviors. This 
very pre-occupation with intelligence-related behaviors may reduce the 
chance of retrieving examples of aggressive behaviors from memory. 
However, it is conceivable that stereotype activation also suppresses 
access to stereotype-inconsistent traits. If one primes 'professor', it may be 
more difficult to think of the trait 'aggressive' and, consequently, of 
aggressive behaviors. Such inhibited access to stereotype-inconsistent traits 
may contribute to the phenomenon of deteriorated recall of stereotype-
inconsistent behaviors. 
There is some evidence that stereotype activation not only facilitates 
access to stereotype-consistent traits (cf. e.g., Devine, 1989; Dovidio, Evans & 
Tyler, 1986; Macrae, Stangor & Milne, 1994), but also inhibits access to 
stereotype-inconsistent traits (Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1996b, 
Chapter 5). In two different paradigms (i.e., lexical decisions and solving 
word puzzles), Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg (1996b, Chapter 5) 
compared the recognition of trait words by stereotype-primed and 
nonstereotype-primed subjects. The traits to be recognized were either 
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stereotype-consistent, stereotype-neutral or stereotype-inconsistent. The 
results showed both enhanced (i.e., faster or better) recognition of 
stereotype-consistent traits and reduced (i.e., slower or worse) recognition of 
stereotype-inconsistent traits due to stereotype activation (both compared to 
the irrelevant-prime control condition and compared to the stereotype-
neutral traits). These results were interpreted as indicative of, respectively, 
facilitated access to stereotype-consistent traits and inhibited access to 
stereotype-inconsistent traits as a result of stereotype activation. In other 
words, upon the activation of the professor stereotype, not only comes the 
trait intelligent more easily to mind, but it also seems that the stereotype 
impedes access to the trait aggressive. As the enhancement and suppression 
effects were virtually of the same magnitude, it seems plausible that both 
mechanisms play an important role in stereotyping (see Gemsbacher & 
Faust, 1991, for a related argument in the language comprehension 
domain). 
As argued above, it is conceivable that the mere pre-occupation with 
the stereotype-consistent trait prevented subjects from searching for 
stereotype-inconsistent behaviors stored in a separate trait-behavior cluster. 
For instance, the activation of the professor stereotype may have incited 
subjects to look for intelligent behaviors, they remember some, and try 
again. As long as the subjects could come up with some stereotype-
consistent behaviors, they may simply have persisted in persuing search 
within the domain of intelligence-related behaviors, thereby reducing the 
chance of recalling behaviors related to stereotype-inconsistent traits 'by 
default'. In such an interpretation of the guided search process, there is no 
need to assume that inhibited access to stereotype-inconsistent traits plays 
any role at all in the observed impeded recall. 
In our view, such a persistent search in a stereotype-consistent 
domain is less likely to occur if there are no stereotype-consistent behaviors 
to retrieve at all or, more precisely, if at the initial encoding stage the group 
(or person) was not associated with any stereotype-consistent trait to begin 
with. When there are no stereotype-consistent behaviors in the stimulus 
material, search via stereotype-consistent traits would result in drawing 
blanks. One would expect subjects, then, to abandon this type of search and 
to try stereotype-inconsistent traits for a change, unless the a posteriori 
activated stereotype hampers access to stereotype-inconsistent traits. 
Experiment 4 tries to elucidate the role of suppressed access to 
stereotype-inconsistent traits in guided retrieval by presenting stereotype-
inconsistent and stereotype-neutral behaviors only. The results of 
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experiment 4 show impeded recall of stereotype-inconsistent behaviors due 
to a posteriori stereotype activation (both compared to the no stereotype 
control condition and compared to recall of the stereotype-neutral 
behaviors) to occur even in the absence of stereotype-consistent behaviors. 
Therefore, it seems plausible that, next to facilitated access to stereotype-
consistent traits, inhibited access to stereotype-inconsistent traits also plays a 
role in stereotype-guided memory search. 
Experiment 1 
The main goal of the first experiment is straightforward. We will try 
to establish the robustness of the phenomenon, that is, impaired retrieval of 
stereotype-inconsistent information from memory due to a posteriori 
activated stereotypes, by replicating the basic findings of our earlier study 
(Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1995a, Chapter 2) with a free recall 
measure. We will compare recall of stereotype-inconsistent information 
under conditions in which a stereotype is activated after encoding with 
recall of stereotype-consistent information under the same conditions and, 
more importantly, we will also compare recall of stereotype-inconsistent 
information after posterior stereotype activation with recall of the same 
information in a no stereotype control condition. 
Wyer and Srull (1989) suggest that there is little reason to assume 
different processes underlying person perception and group perception, as 
long as the target group is a cohesive one, that is, a group that is bound by 
common aims and norms of behavior (see also Rojahn & Pettigrew, 1992; 
but see Stern, Marrs, Millar & Cole, 1984; Wyer, Bodenhausen & Srull, 1984). 
In the context of a test of the robustness of the effect, and because in most 
relevant studies stereotypes are activated before encoding, we will study a 
target person as well a target group for exploratory purposes. 
Method 
Subjects and Design 
Seventy-one undergraduate students from the University of 
Nijmegen participated in the study, receiving Dfl. 5 (approximately 3 US 
Dollars) in return. Subjects were randomly assigned to the cells of a 2 
(stereotype activation: no stereotype activation vs stereotype activation after 
encoding) χ 2 (target: group vs individual) between-subjects design. Type of 
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behavior (stereotype-consistent vs stereotype-inconsistent) constituted the 
within-subjects factor. 
Pretesting of stimulus materials 
First, in a pilot study, thirty-three subjects evaluated 110 behavioral 
descriptions on a nine-point scale ranging from 1 (undesirable behavior) to 
9 (desirable behavior). On the basis of this pilot study, 50 behavioral 
evaluatively neutral descriptions were selected that were more or less of the 
same length (25 to 35 characters). In a second pilot study, forty (other) 
subjects rated these descriptions on stereotypicality for members of four 
social groups: artists, professors, police officers and environmental activists. 
Subjects were asked how likely it is for a member of a group to perform a 
particular behavior. Nine-point scales were used with poles labeled "not at 
all likely" and "very likely". 
Artists (or an artist) were chosen as target in the first experiment. 
Eighteen behavioral descriptions were selected of which six were consistent 
with the stereotype (M=6.98) and six were inconsistent with the stereotype 
(M=3.09). Furthermore, six filler items were selected (M=5.05). All items 
were evaluatively neutral. 
Procedure 
Subjects participated in the experiment in groups up to 9 persons per 
session. They were placed in individual cubicles containing an Apple 
Macintosh computer, which was used to provide all information 
concerning the experiment. They were asked to read a series of behavioral 
descriptions about members of a group (or about a single individual) at their 
own pace and to form an impression of this group (or individual). In the 
group condition, descriptions were accompanied by (male) first names. In 
the person condition, all descriptions were accompanied by the name 
"Bart". In all conditions, the first two items as well as the last two items to 
appear on the screen, were fillers (i.e., stereotype-neutral behaviors). All 
other items were presented in random order. In the stereotype afterwards 
condition subjects were informed, on the first screen after the presentation 
of the behavioral descriptions, that they had been reading about artists (or 
an artist). In the no stereotype activation condition, no such information 
was provided. After completion of the reading task, subjects were presented 
with a free recall task. Subsequently subjects were paid and debriefed. 
Dependent variables 
After reading the behavioral statements, subjects were asked to recall 
as many behavioral descriptions as possible. They were given 6 minutes to 
complete this task. 
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Results and Discussion 
Recall 
The number of each type of item recalled was counted for each 
subject. Filler items, however, were not included in the analyses because 
they were not presented in random order. An item was counted as correct if 
the general meaning of the original item was reflected (cf. e.g., Gordon & 
Wyer, 1987; Hastie & Kumar, 1979; Srull, 1981; 1983). A 2 (time of stereotype 
activation: no stereotype vs stereotype after encoding) χ 2 (target: group vs 
individual) between-subjects χ 2 (item type: stereotype-consistent vs 
stereotype-inconsistent) within-subjects ANOVA revealed a main effect for 
target. Subjects recalled a higher proportion of the information when the 
target was a person (M=.596, excluding fillers) than when it was a group 
(M=.519, F (1,67)= 5.19, ρ < .03). No other main effects were found. 
The only significant interaction obtained was the predicted stereotype 
activation χ item type interaction (F (1,67)= 4.21, ρ < .05, see Table 1). 
Stereotype activation did not influence the recall of stereotype-consistent 
information (F (1,67) = .22, n.s.). It did, however, affect the recall of 
stereotype-inconsistent information. As predicted, memory for stereotype-
inconsistent information was worse in the stereotype after condition than 
in the no stereotype condition (F (1,67)= 4.63, ρ < .04). Furthermore, memory 
for stereotype-consistent information was better than memory for 
stereotype-inconsistent information in the stereotype after condition (F 
(1,67)=4.95, ρ < .03), while there was no difference in recall of stereotype-
consistent and stereotype-inconsistent items in the no stereotype condition 
(F (1,67)= .46, n.s.). 
Table 1. Recall of consistent and inconsistent information (percentages). 
person group 
consistent inconsistent consistent inconsistent 
no stereotype 59.8 64.7 52.8 53.7 
stereotype 59.3 54.6 57.4 43.5 
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In sum, an a posteriori activated stereotype impairs retrieval of 
stereotype-inconsistent information from memory, both under person 
perception conditions and under group perception conditions. By 
replicating earlier findings (Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1995a, Chapter 
2), with a different memory measure, the effect appears to be robust. 
Experiment 2 
Following from our theoretical argument outlined in the 
introduction, the hypothesis to be tested is that recall of stereotype-
inconsistent information will be impaired upon a posteriori stereotype 
activation if it is stored in a separate trait-behavior cluster not fitting in with 
the stereotype, while no differential recall of stereotype-consistent and 
stereotype-inconsistent information is expected if stereotype-consistent and 
stereotype-inconsistent behaviors are stored in the same stereotype-related 
trait-behavior cluster. 
It may seem confusing that a trait organization explanation is being 
advanced while this issue was not addressed in the construction of the 
stimulus material of experiment 1. Frankly, this explanation was not 
considered at the time we designed experiment 1. In view of our present 
theorizing, it may be worthwhile to take another look at the items used in 
this experiment. What were the stereotype-consistent behaviors for 'artists'? 
Some examples: "Often forgets to lock the front door", "Sometimes does'nt 
do the dishes for a week", and "Arranged to be rejected as unfit for the 
army". What were the stereotype-inconsistent items? For instance: "Had an 
A for math at highschool", "Often visits soccer matches", and "Goes to 
church every Sunday". In retrospect, it seems that some of the stereotype-
consistent items (e.g., those referring to absent-mindedness, and a non-
conformist attitude) do not bear on the same trait dimensions as the 
stereotype-inconsistent items (e.g., pertaining to math ability and sports 
interest) but, with some imagination, the stereotype-consistent aversion 
against military service and the stereotype-inconsistent religious attitude 
may be construed as bearing on an underlying ethics trait dimension. 
Hence, in terms of underlying memory organization, the stereotype-
consistent behaviors and the stereotype-inconsistent behaviors may have 
had some dissociated as well as some common trait implications, the 
former being theoretically conducive of impaired recall of stereotype-
inconsistent behaviors due to a posteriori stereotype activation, while the 
latter presumably were not affected by it. The resulting ambiguity 
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concerning the role of trait organization will be explicitly addressed in 
experiment 2. 
The hypothesis that impaired recall of stereotype-inconsistent 
behaviors depends on their memory dissociation from stereotype-consistent 
behaviors was tested in experiment 2. We provided subjects either with 
information loaded on the same trait dimension (e.g., intelligent and stupid 
behaviors) or with information loaded on different trait-dimensions (e.g., 
intelligent and aggressive behaviors). Again, a stereotype will be either 
activated afterwards or not at all. 
In experiment 2, the recall task is used to measure both recall and 
ARC-scores (Roenker, Thompson & Brown, 1971). ARC-scores may be used 
to obtain evidence for differential storage for different item types in the 
same versus different traits conditions. It follows from our trait 
organization argument that we should obtain higher ARC-scores (i.e., 
stronger clustering) for stereotype-consistent and stereotype-inconsistent 
behaviors under conditions with two separate trait-behavior clusters than 
under conditions in which stereotype-consistent and stereotype-inconsistent 
behaviors are expected to be stored in the same cluster. Note that the 
presumed memory organization of stereotype-consistent and stereotype-
inconsistent behaviors in the same or different trait-behavior clusters is 
assumed to take place during encoding (although the validity of this 
assumption is difficult to verify, see Klein & Loftus, 1990). That is, we 
assume that memory organization in terms of one versus two trait-
behavior clusters will as such not be affected by later stereotype activation 
(despite the fact that it may help to explain its effects on retrieval). In a 
sense, these ARC scores may be regarded as checks on the trait organization 
manipulation. 
For practical reasons, and because of the comparable results obtained 
in experiment 1 for person perception and group perception, only group 
perception is studied in this experiment. 
Method 
Subjects and Design 
Ninety-six undergraduate students from the University of Nijmegen 
were randomly assigned to the cells of a 2 (stereotype activation: no 
stereotype activation vs stereotype activation after encoding) χ 2 (number of 
trait dimensions in the stimulus material: 1- stereotype-consistent and 
stereotype-inconsistent information loaded on the same trait dimension vs 
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2- stereotype-consistent and stereotype-inconsistent information loaded on 
different dimensions) χ 2 (target: professors vs hooligans) χ 2 (stimulus set: 
the intelligent/ nonintelligent set vs the aggressive/ nonaggressive set in 
the one-trait conditions and the intelligent/ aggressive set vs the 
nonintelligent/ nonaggressive set in the two-traits conditions) between-
subjects design. Item type (stereotype-consistent vs stereotype-inconsistent) 
constituted the within-subjects factor. Subjects received Dfl. 5 for 
participating. 
Pretesting of stimulus materials 
Thirty-three subjects rated fourteen social groups on fourteen trait 
dimensions. Nine-point scales were used with poles labeled "members of 
this group are not at all...(l)" and "members of this group are very...(9)". To 
control for possible negative-positive asymmetries (e.g., Ikegami, 1993; 
Reeder, 1979; Skowronski & Carlston, 1987; Vonk, 1993), two groups were 
selected with opposite scores. Professors were perceived as intelligent 
(M=7.79) and as nonaggressive (M=2.98) and hooligans were perceived as 
aggressive (M=8.75) and as nonintelligent (M=1.87). Subsequently, forty 
(other) subjects rated 98 behaviors on intelligence and aggressiveness. Nine-
point scales were used with poles labeled "performing this behavior is not at 
all...(l)" and "performing this behavior is very...(9)" (e.g., intelligent). Thirty 
behaviors were selected of which 6 were intelligent, 6 were nonintelligent, 6 
were aggressive, 6 were nonaggressive and 6 were neutral. Behaviors that 
loaded on one trait dimension were neutral with respect to the other trait 
dimension (see Table 2 for means). 
Table 2. Stimulus material (ratings on nine-point scales) 
intelligence aggressiveness 
intelligent items 
nonintelligent items 
aggressive items 
nonaggressive items 
fillers 
7.12 
2.98 
4.41 
5.45 
5.06 
4.32 
5.16 
7.36 
2.72 
4.96 
Four stimulus sets were constructed with 6 stereotype-consistent 
descriptions, 6 stereotype-inconsistent descriptions and (for all sets the 
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same) 6 filler items (i.e., stereotype-neutral items). In two sets, stereotype-
consistent and stereotype-inconsistent behaviors had implications for the 
same trait dimension (either intelligent and nonintelligent behaviors, or 
aggressive and nonaggressive behaviors). In the two remaining sets, 
stereotype-consistent and stereotype-inconsistent behaviors loaded on 
different dimensions (intelligent and aggressive behaviors, nonintelligent 
and nonaggressive behaviors). The resulting design, then, is a 2 (stereotype 
activation) χ 2 (target) χ 2 (number of traits) χ 2 (stimulus set) between-
subjects design, with a 2 (item type) level factor as within-subjects factor. 
Procedure. 
The reading task and the stereotype activation manipulation were 
administered in the same way as in experiment 1. As in experiment 1, the 
first two behaviors as well as the last two behaviors to appear on the screen 
were fillers. All other behaviors were presented in random order. After 
reading the behavioral descriptions (and, in the stereotype afterwards 
condition, the introduction of the group label), subjects were presented with 
a free recall task. At the end, subjects were paid and debriefed. 
Dependent variables. 
The free recall task was conducted in the same way as in experiment 
1. It was now also used to calculate ARC-scores. 
Results and Discussion 
Recall 
The number of correctly recalled stereotype-consistent and stereotype-
inconsistent descriptions were counted for each subject. Again, filler items 
were not included in the analyses because they were not presented in 
random order. A 2 (Stereotype activation) χ 2 (Number of traits in the 
stimulus material) χ 2 (Target: professors vs hooligans) χ 2 (Stimulus set: the 
intelligent/ nonintelligent set vs the aggressive/ nonaggressive set in the 
one-trait conditions and the intelligent/ aggressive set vs the 
nonintelligent/ nonaggressive set in the two-traits conditions) between-
subjects χ 2 (item type) within-subjects ANOVA revealed a stereotype 
activation χ number of traits χ item type interaction (F (1,80)= 4.54, ρ < .04, 
see Table 3 for means). No other effects were obtained. 
Simple two-way interactions revealed that in the no stereotype 
control condition and the a posteriori stereotype activation condition there 
was no differential recall for stereotype-consistent and stereotype-
inconsistent information when they loaded on the same trait dimension (F 
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(1,80)= .09, n.s.), while there was a differential recall effect of stereotype 
activation under conditions with different trait dimensions (F (1,80)= 10.98, 
ρ < .002). Under conditions with different trait dimensions, memory for 
stereotype-inconsistent information was worse when a stereotype was 
activated after encoding compared to the no stereotype control condition (F 
(1,80)= 16.48, ρ < .001), while there was no effect at all of stereotype 
activation on stereotype-consistent behaviors (F < 1). In other words, 
reduced recall of stereotype-inconsistent information due to a posteriori 
stereotype activation only occurred when it was stored in a separate trait-
behavior cluster. Furthermore, in the stereotype-afterwards condition, 
memory for stereotype-inconsistent information was worse than memory 
for stereotype-consistent information under conditions with separate trait-
behavior clusters (F (1,80)= 17.11, ρ < .001), while there was no recall 
difference in the no stereotype control condition (F < 1). 
Table 3. Recall of consistent and inconsistent information (percentages) 
1 trait 2 traits 
consistent inconsistent consistent inconsistent 
no stereotype 50.0 47.9 54.8 55.6 
stereotype 50.7 50.7 55.1 34.8 
ARC-scores 
Behaviors that are stored under the same trait-behavior cluster are 
likely to be reproduced in free recall consecutively (i.e., in strings of two or 
more) above chance expectation. The extent to which such clustering occurs 
is indicated by ARC-scores (Roenker et al., 1971). In conditions in which the 
information is stored in two separate clusters, one would therefore expect 
ARC-scores for stereotype-consistent and stereotype-inconsistent behaviors 
to be higher compared to these ARC-scores in conditions in which all 
behaviors are stored in one single cluster. 
Two ARC-scores were computed, one representing the clustering of 
stereotype-consistent behaviors, the other representing the clustering of 
stereotype-inconsistent behaviors. These two ARC-scores were subjected to a 
2 (Stereotype activation) χ 2 (Number of traits in the stimulus material) χ 2 
(Target) χ 2 (Stimulus set) between-subjects χ 2 (ARC-scores) within-subjects 
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ANOVA. The only effect obtained was a main effect of number of traits. In 
agreement with the intended memory organization, it was found that 
clustering was higher in conditions in which stereotype-consistent and 
stereotype-inconsistent information had implications for different trait 
dimensions (ARCcon= .22 and ARCinc= .19) than in conditions in which 
stereotype-consistent and stereotype-inconsistent information had 
implications for the same trait dimension (ARCcon= .13 and ARCinc= .13; F 
(1,80)= 5.22, ρ < .03). 
In our guided retrieval explanation, the occurrence of deteriorated 
recall of stereotype-inconsistent information as a result of a posteriori 
stereotype activation is argued to depend on its separate trait-cluster 
organization in memory. That is, a stereotype afterwards should bring about 
impaired recall of stereotype-inconsistent behaviors to the extent that these 
are stored in a separate trait-behavior cluster. One piece of evidence 
sustaining this line of argument is provided by the above reported higher 
ARC scores in the two-traits versus one-trait condition. In addition, one 
might on the basis of the same argument expect the recall of stereotype-
inconsistent behaviors in the two traits/ a posteriori stereotype condition to 
be inversely related to the clustering of stereotype-inconsistent behaviors in 
a separate trait. In agreement with our argument, we indeed found a 
substantial and significant negative correlation between the ARC-index for 
inconsistent information and the recall of this information in this 
condition (r= -.59, n= 24, ρ < .004). 
Considering the evidence provided in experiment 2, the conclusion 
seems warranted that deteriorated recall of stereotype-inconsistent 
behaviors due to a posteriori stereotype activation is contingent upon their 
storage in a separate stereotype-inconsistent trait-behavior cluster. In other 
words, if memory storage of stereotype-inconsistent behaviors is dissociated 
from the storage of stereotype-consistent behaviors, the afterwards induced 
stereotype leads to their reduced recall. The question addressed in the next 
experiment is whether deteriorated recall of stereotype-inconsistent 
information results from an intentional and strategic search for stereotype-
consistent information, or from an involuntary, perhaps even 
nonconscious, enhanced activation of stereotype-consistent traits and, 
potentially, also an involuntary de-activation of stereotype-inconsistent 
traits. 
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Experiment 3 
One general approach towards explaining reduced recall of stereotype-
inconsistent behaviors due to a posteriori stereotype activation is based on 
the assumption that subjects more or less deliberately make use of their 
knowledge of what the stimulus group is (said to be) like. Memory search 
may, for instance, take on confirmatory properties (see, e.g., Snyder & 
Swann, 1978, for a related argument in the domain of external information 
search). That is, subjects may search their memory for behaviors that fit in 
with traits stereotypically attributed to the group. They may think, for 
example, "Ah, these are hooligans. They must be aggressive. Right, I 
remember some aggressive behaviors." The stereotype may also incite 
subjects to disregard stereotype-inconsistent information, even if they do 
remember having seen such behaviors. "Explaining quantum theory? 
Hooligans? No way!" 
Another, also strategic and deliberate, account would be to assume the 
operation of demand characteristics (Orne, 1962). Experiment 1 and 2 
confront subjects with a curious string of events, which may well make 
them wonder what on earth the experimenter is up to. "A professor 
wrecking a telephone booth? I think I'm not supposed to write that down." 
Obviously, there is one major flaw in this strategy-based account. It 
fails to explain the pivotal role of associated (same trait) versus dissociated 
(separate traits) storage of stereotype-inconsistent and stereotype-consistent 
information in memory. It is, however, conceivable that when the 
stereotype-consistent and the stereotype-inconsistent information bear on 
the same trait dimension, the inherent contradictions in the stimulus 
material (and possibly the attentand 'inconsistency resolution' attempts, see, 
e.g., Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1995a, Chapter 2; Wyer & Srull, 1989) 
may have obliterated the strategic handling of the situation, essentially 
because the cognitive effort invested in understanding these inherent 
contradictions may have diverted attention away from other information 
provided in the experiment. 
Alternatively, the stereotype-guided retrieval process may be quite 
unintentional. The activated stereotype of hooligans may simply have 
installed the concept of aggressiveness in the subject's mind. Thinking of 
aggressiveness may have — unintentionally and without any deliberate 
search strategy operating — brought some of the just learned aggressive 
behaviors to mind at the expense of accessing stereotype-inconsistent traits 
and behaviors. In addition, recall of stereotype-inconsistent information 
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stored in a separate stereotype-inconsistent trait concept, may also suffer 
from involuntarily reduced accessibility of stereotype-inconsistent traits due 
to a posteriori stereotype activation (cf. Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 
1996b, Chapter 5). 
The operation of intentional search and selection mechanisms 
described above would require that subjects see the activated stereotype as 
pertaining to the group about which they just have received behavioral 
information. In other words, subjects must apply the activated stereotype to 
the group for it to affect the recall process intentionally. If, however, as we 
argue, the stereotype guides memory search through unintentional and 
probably nonconscious processes, deteriorated recall of stereotype-
inconsistent behaviors of group members would still be obtained even if the 
a posteriori stereotype activation is brought about by an 'unrelated prime', 
that is, by priming the stereotype in such a way that there is is no plausible 
reason to associate it with the group or the stimulus behaviors. 
In order to obtain evidence for our argument that a posteriori 
stereotypes impede recall of separately stored stereotype-inconsistent 
information via involuntary processes rather than deliberate search 
strategies or selective responding, we replicated experiment 2 with one 
important modification. In experiment 3 we activate the stereotype in an 
ostensibly unrelated task (e.g. Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1996b, 
Chapter 5; Higgins, Rholes & Jones, 1977; Macrae, Stangor & Milne, 1994; 
Wyer & Srull, 1986). The stereotype activation procedure was the same as 
the procedure used in experiments conducted by Macrae, Stangor & Milne 
(1994; see also Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1996b, Chapter 5). Subjects 
were asked to think about a soccer-hooligan (or a professor) and to list 
lifestyle and appearance of a typical member of this group. If with the use of 
such an unrelated prime we replicate the results of experiment 2, a strategic 
explanation of the deteriorated recall phenomenon would become highly 
unlikely, while it would strengthen the case for an explanation in terms of 
unintentional processes. 
Method 
Subjects and Design 
One-hundred and twelve undergraduate students from the 
University of Nijmegen were randomly assigned to the cells of a 2 
(stereotype activation: no stereotype activation vs stereotype activation after 
encoding) χ 2 (number of trait dimensions in the stimulus material: 1-
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consistent and inconsistent information loaded one the same trait 
dimension vs 2- consistent and inconsistent information loaded on 
different dimensions) χ 2 (target: professors vs hooligans) χ 2 (stimulus set: 
the intelligent/ nonintelligent set vs the aggressive/ nonaggressive set in 
the one-trait conditions and the intelligent/ aggressive set vs the 
nonintelligent/ nonaggressive set in the two-traits conditions) between-
subjects design. Item type (stereotype-consistent vs stereotype-inconsistent) 
serves as within-subjects factor. Subjects received Dfl. 5 for participating. 
Because the stereotype activation procedure may give rise to 
suspicion among subjects who may be familiar with deceptions used in 
social psychological experimentation, we used only students from other 
faculties and college freshmen (the experiment was conducted in 
September) as subjects. 
The design, the stimulus materials and the dependent variables used 
are the same as in experiment 2. As outlined before, the only difference 
concerns the stereotype activation procedure. 
Stereotype activation 
After subjects read the behavioral descriptions they were told that a 
colleague of the experimenter needed some information to be used in a 
forthcoming experiment. Under no stereotype activation conditions subjects 
were asked to list as many capital cities as they were able to come up with. 
Under stereotype activation conditions subjects were asked to think about a 
typical soccer-hooligan (or a typical professor) and to list attributes of his or 
her lifestyle and appearance. Both subjects under no stereotype activation 
conditions and subjects under stereotype activation conditions were given 
five minutes to complete this task. Subsequently, the recall task was 
introduced. Upon probing in the debriefing, none of the subjects indicated 
suspicion as to the real purpose of the priming task (i.e., they perceived it as 
an unrelated task). 
Results and Discussion 
Recall 
The number of correctly recalled stereotype-consistent and stereotype-
inconsistent descriptions were counted for each subject. Again, filler items 
were not included in the analyses because they were not presented in 
random order. These data were subjected to a 2 (Stereotype activation) χ 2 
(Number of traits in the stimulus material) χ 2 (Target: professors vs 
hooligans) χ 2 (Stimulus set: the intelligent/ nonintelligent set vs the 
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aggressive/ nonaggressive set in the one-trait conditions and the 
intelligent/ aggressive set vs the nonintelligent/ nonaggressive set in the 
two-traits conditions) between-subjects χ 2 (item type) within-subjects 
ANOVA. First, a main effect for stereotype activation was found. Subjects 
recalled more information under no stereotype conditions than under 
stereotype activation conditions (F (1,96)= 7.13, ρ < .01). This effect is 
qualified by the three-way interaction described below. 
The only significant interaction of theoretical interest3 obtained was 
the predicted three-way interaction of stereotype activation χ number of 
traits χ item type (F (1,96)= 4.03, ρ < .05, see Table 3 for means). Simple 
interactions revealed that no differential recall was found when stereotype-
consistent and stereotype-inconsistent information loaded on the same trait 
dimension (F (1,96)= .10, n.s.) and that recall of stereotype inconsistent 
information was impaired after an a posteriori activated stereotype under 
conditions with different trait dimensions (F (1,96)= 17.00, ρ < .001). Under 
conditions with different trait dimensions, memory for stereotype-
inconsistent information was worse when a stereotype was activated after 
encoding compared to the no stereotype control condition (F (1,96)= 18.30, ρ 
< .001). Furthermore, memory for stereotype-inconsistent information was 
worse than memory for stereotype-consistent information under conditions 
with separate trait-behavior clusters and an a posteriori activated stereotype 
(F (1,96)= 21.30, ρ < .001). No other simple main effects were obtained. 
Table 4. Recall of consistent and inconsistent information (percentages). 
1 trait 2 traits 
consistent inconsistent consistent inconsistent 
no stereotype 49.4 46.7 54.0 47.1 
stereotype 41.1 42.3 46.0 29.3 
ARC-scores 
Again, ARC-scores were calculated to provide evidence for the 
presumed memory organization in terms of 1 versus 2 traits. Two ARC-
scores were computed, one representing the clustering of consistent 
behaviors, the other representing the clustering of inconsistent behaviors. 
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The ARC-scores were subjected to a 2 (Stereotype activation) χ 2 (Number of 
traits in the stimulus material) χ 2 (Target) χ 2 (Stimulus set) between-
subjects χ 2 (ARC-scores) within-subjects design. Again, a main effect for 
number of traits was found, although it failed to reach significance. In case 
stereotype-consistent and stereotype-inconsistent information had 
implications for different trait dimensions, clustering was higher (ARCcon= 
.24 and ARCinc= .28) than under conditions where stereotype-consistent 
and stereotype-inconsistent information had implications for the same trait 
dimension (ARCcon= .17 and ARCinc= .20; F (1,96)= 3.15, ρ < .08). 
We expected retrieval loss of stereotype-inconsistent information to 
depend on the way in which this information is stored in memory. 
Stereotype-inconsistent information stored in a separate trait-behavior 
cluster (i.e., dissociated from the stereotype-consistent information) should 
be hard to access. Hence, subjects who stored this information separately 
should show impaired retrieval of stereotype-inconsistent behaviors and, 
therefore, the degree of separate clustering should be correlated negatively 
with recall of this information. We calculated the correlation between the 
ARC-score for stereotype-inconsistent information and recall of this 
information under two-trait stereotype activation. Although the correlation 
failed to reach significance this time, it was indeed negative (r= -.31, n= 28, ρ 
< .13). 
The present experiment shows that stereotype activation by means of 
an unrelated priming task ~ i.e., a task explicitly and seemingly 
convincingly (as probes in the debriefing yielded no indications of 
suspicion) presented as unrelated to the experiment — does lead to 
deteriorated recall of stereotype-inconsistent behaviors stored in a separate 
trait-behavior cluster, while recall of stereotype-inconsistent information 
stored together with stereotype-consistent behaviors in the same trait-
behavior cluster does not suffer from the primed stereotype. In our view, 
these data constitute compelling evidence that the biased retrieval 
phenomenon described is of an involuntary nature, rather than the result 
of a controlled strategic search for stereotype-consistent information or a 
deliberate strategy of suppressing inconsistent responses. Except for some 
minor deviations, the effects of the unrelated prime in experiment 3 
parallel those of the a posteriori stereotype activation in experiment 2, 
suggesting that the observed deteriorated recall of stereotype-inconsistent 
information observed in experiment 2 may be ascribed to facilitatory and/or 
inhibitory effects of stereotype activation. Furthermore, as in experiment 2, 
in the two-traits conditions we observed stronger clustering of stereotype-
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consistent and stereotype-inconsistent information (as indicated by the 
ARC-scores) than in the one-trait conditions, underscoring the postulated 
role of the organization in memory of behavioral information in terms of 
trait clusters with regard to the deteriorated recall phenomenon. 
Experiment 4 
In our theoretical account of deteriorated recall of stereotype-
inconsistent information, we have suggested that two co-ordinate processes 
may contribute to the observed phenomenon, namely facilitated access to 
stereotype-consistent traits and inhibited access to stereotype-inconsistent 
traits. Considering the evidence obtained sofar, it is, however, not necessary 
to posit reduced access to stereotype-inconsistent traits upon stereotype 
activation. It may be argued that the search in memory for behavioral 
information often starts with stereotype-consistent traits, due to the strong 
links between these traits and the stereotype (or the schema, or person 
concept; see e.g. Srull, 1981; Srull & Wyer, 1989). Under two-traits conditions 
(i.e., separate storage of stereotype-consistent and stereotype-inconsistent 
information), then, the enhanced probability that the search process starts in 
the stereotype-consistent trait-behavior cluster may simply explain the 
reduced recall of stereotype-inconsistent information. That is, the reduced 
recall of stereotype-inconsistent behaviors may be interpreted as a byproduct 
of the preferential retrieval of information from the stereotype-consistent 
cluster. 
However, if, as we argue, stereotype activation also reduces access to 
stereotype-inconsistent traits, the deteriorated recall of stereotype-
inconsistent information will be retained even if there are no stereotype-
consistent behaviors at all presented in the stimulus set. That is, in 
situations in which a group about which information was provided is not 
associated with any stereotype-consistent trait to begin with, search via 
stereotype-consistent traits would be fruitless. The recall task would then 
require subjects to search for other information, including stereotype-
inconsistent information, unless access to stereotype-inconsistent traits 
would be impeded due to the stereotype activation. 
In experiment 4 we provide subjects only with stereotype-inconsistent 
and stereotype-neutral information. It may be argued that in such a 
situation a stereotype activated afterwards would not affect recall of 
stereotype-inconsistent information any more than it would affect 
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stereotype-neutral information, unless the activated stereotype suppresses 
access to stereotype-inconsistent traits. 
The stereotype activation task used in experiment 4 is the same as in 
experiment 3 for two reasons. First, a replication with this procedure may 
demonstrate the robustness of the effect obtained in experiment 3. Second, 
subjects might get suspicious or confused when, after they heard what the 
group consisted of, they realize that they have not read one single behavior 
consistent with the stereotype. The unrelated stereotype prime would avoid 
this confusion. 
Method 
Subjects and Design 
Thirty-six undergraduate students from the University of Nijmegen 
were randomly assigned to the cells of a 2 (stereotype activation: no 
stereotype activation vs stereotype activation after encoding) χ 2 target: 
soccer-hooligans vs professors) χ 2 (stimulus set: intelligent vs non-
aggressive behaviors for soccer-hooligans and aggressive vs non-intelligent 
behaviors for professors) between-subjects design. Subjects received Dfl. 5 
for participating. Only freshmen and students from outside the Psychology 
faculty were allowed to participate. Again debriefing indicated that the 
stereotype activation task was perceived as a distinct task. 
Except for the stimulus material, the experiment is a replication of 
experiment 3. 
Stimulus materials 
Subjects were provided with eighteen behavioral descriptions. Six of 
them were inconsistent with the stereotype, the remaining 12 were fillers. 
Subjects in the stereotype activation condition were either provided with 
the stereotype of a soccer-hooligan or with the stereotype of a professor. In 
case the stereotype of soccer-hooligans was activated, subjects received either 
a set with 6 non-aggressive behaviors or with 6 intelligent behaviors. 
Subjects for whom the stereotype of professors was activated either received 
6 aggressive behaviors or 6 non-intelligent behaviors. In the no stereotype 
control condition subjects were requested to list capital cities. The stimulus 
sets presented in these control conditions matched those used in the 
stereotype activation conditions. All subjects were provided with the same 
filler items. Six filler items were already used in experiment 2 and 3. The 
remaining six items were selected form the pilot-study described in the 
Method section of experiment 2. These items were neutral with respect to 
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aggressiveness (M=4.78) and with respect to intelligence (M=5.18). In this 
experiment, all items, including the filler items, are presented in random 
order. 
Results and Discussion 
Recall 
Correctly recalled stereotype-inconsistent items and stereotype-
neutral items were counted for each subject. A 2 (Stereotype activation) χ 2 
(Target: professors vs hooligans) χ 2 (Stimulus set: the intelligent set vs the 
nonaggressive set in the "soccer-hooligan condition" and the aggressive set 
vs the nonintelligent set in the "professor condition") between-subjects χ 2 
(item type: stereotype-inconsistent vs stereotype-neutral) within-subjects 
ANOVA was performed with proportion recalled as dependent variable. 
Again, a main effect of stereotype activation was found. Overall recall was 
poorer when a stereotype was activated than when it was not activated (F 
(1,32)= 6.71, ρ < .02). The significant two-way interaction of stereotype 
activation χ item type qualifies this main effect, as predicted (F (1,32)= 4.25, ρ 
< .05, see Table 5 for means). Recall of stereotype-inconsistent information 
suffered from an activated stereotype (F (1,32)= 8.62, ρ < .01), while recall of 
the stereotype-neutral items did not (F (1,32)= .60, n.s.). 
Table 5. Recall of inconsistent information and filler items (percentages). 
inconsistent fillers 
no stereotype 50.5 46.1 
stereotype 31.5 42.3 
These results suggest that behavioral information that is inconsistent 
with a later activated stereotype is more difficult to retrieve from memory 
than stereotype-neutral behavioral information in the filler items (the latter 
having no shared trait implications with the stereotype-inconsistent 
information as shown in the reported pilot study results). As the present 
results demonstrate that impaired recall of stereotype-inconsistent 
information is obtained even in the absence of any stereotype-consistent 
information, it may be argued that the impeded recall of stereotype-
inconsistent information observed in experiments 2 and 3 may, at least 
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partly, have been due to impaired access to stereotype-inconsistent traits due 
to stereotype activation rather than (exclusively) to preferential search for 
stereotype-consistent information. The present results further demonstrate 
that, as in experiment 3, stereotype activation by means of a priming task 
ostensibly unrelated to the behavioral information presented earlier does 
reduce access to stereotype-inconsistent behaviors, suggesting that the 
inhibition phenomenon studied is of an involuntary nature. 
General Discussion 
The present experiments show that stereotype activation leads to 
deteriorated recall of stereotype-inconsistent behaviors. Results establishing 
this phenomenon were obtained across four experiments in which three 
different target groups (artists, professors and soccer-hooligans) were 
studied. In a previous study (Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1995a, 
Chapter 2) comparable results were obtained for two different target groups 
(environmental activists and professional soldiers). Moreover, impaired 
memory for stereotype-inconsistent behaviors due to a posteriori stereotype 
activation was demonstrated in a recognition paradigm (Dijksterhuis & van 
Knippenberg, 1995a, Chapter 2) as well as in a free recall paradigm. So, 
considering these results the impaired memory phenomenon seems to be 
robust. 
In experiment 2 a theoretical explanation in terms of trait-behavior 
clusters was tested. On the basis of person memory research (e.g., 
Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1996a, Chapter 3; Hamilton, Driscoll & 
Worth, 1989), it was argued that if stereotype-consistent and stereotype-
inconsistent behaviors have implications for different trait dimension (e.g., 
aggressive and intelligent behaviors), these behaviors are stored under 
different trait-behavior cluster, while stereotype-consistent and stereotype-
inconsistent behaviors having implications for the same trait (e.g., 
aggressive and non-aggressive behaviors) are stored under the same trait-
behavior cluster. It was further argued that a later activated stereotype 
would deteriorate recall of stereotype-inconsistent information only when it 
was stored in a separate trait-behavior cluster which as such was 
inconsistent with the activated stereotype. 
In agreement with this line of argument, the results of experiment 2 
show that impeded recall of stereotype-inconsistent behaviors only occurred 
when they had implications for a different trait than the stereotype-
consistent behaviors (as suggested by the results of a pilot study), and not 
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when they had implications for the same trait as the stereotype-consistent 
behaviors. The presumed underlying differential memory organization of 
stereotype-inconsistent and stereotype-consistent information in terms of 
separate traits versus the same trait was further corroborated by ARC-data 
(i.e., stronger clustering of stereotype-inconsistent and stereotype-consistent 
behavioral information, respectively, in the separate traits conditions). In 
addition, the obtained negative correlation between the ARC-score for 
stereotype-inconsistent behaviors and recall of this information under two-
trait stereotype activation conditions provided further support for the idea 
that separate clustering in a stereotype-inconsistent trait underlies impaired 
recall of stereotype-inconsistent information. 
Our guided search interpretation of the observed decreased recall of 
separately stored stereotype-inconsistent information is that the a posteriori 
activated stereotype involuntarily directs memory search in the direction of 
stereotype-consistent information and away from stereotype-inconsistent 
information, probably without people's awareness of the influence of the 
stereotype on retrieval. Alternatively, one could ascribe the observed 
decreased recall to an intentional retrieval or response strategy aimed at 
recalling and reproducing stereotype-consistent behaviors, possibly even 
accompanied by a strategic suppression of stereotype-inconsistent responses. 
Experiment 3 was designed to investigate the idea that stereotype-
biased retrieval results from involuntary and probably nonconscious 
cognitive processes, rather than from strategic memory search and selective 
response editing. After the presentation of the stimulus material, subjects 
were requested to help out another experimenter. They received either a 
filler task or were asked to think about "professors" (or "soccer-hooligans") 
and list features of their lifestyle and appearance. This manipulation, 
ostensibly unrelated to the experiment and, therefore, unlikely to elicit 
deliberate retrieval or response strategies, yielded the same pattern of results 
as the no versus afterwards stereotype activation manipulation of 
experiment 2. It may therefore be concluded that the obtained impaired 
recall of separately stored stereotype-inconsistent behavioral information 
was due to an involuntary process instead of being the result of an 
intentional search strategy. Again, as in experiment 2, the ARC-scores 
indicated separate clustering in the two-traits condition, underscoring our 
explanation in terms of the underlying trait organization. 
The possibility that the mere prevalence of the involuntary search for 
stereotype-consistent information and subsequent reproduction of such 
information simply detracts from retrieving stereotype-inconsistent 
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behaviors organized in a separate stereotype-inconsistent trait cluster (rather 
than the latter being difficult to access) was investigated in experiment 4. 
This experiment was identical to experiment 3, except that all stereotype-
consistent behaviors were replaced by additional stereotype-neutral items. It 
appeared that a posteriori stereotype activation resulted in decreased recall 
of stereotype-inconsistent behaviors (both compared to the no stereotype 
control condition and compared to the recall of stereotype-neutral 
behaviors). As there were no stereotype-consistent behaviors to retrieve, it 
seems unlikely that the decreased recall of stereotype-inconsistent behaviors 
may be ascribed to a consistency prevalence in the retrieval of behaviors. It 
therefore seems plausible that stereotype activation essentially makes it 
more difficult to access behaviors organized in a stereotype-inconsistent 
trait. 
Our present explanation of deteriorated recall of stereotype-
inconsistent information due to a posteriori stereotype activation may have 
some important theoretical implications. Since the investigated 
phenomenon appears to be robust, models describing memory for social 
information may need to be extended. The associative network model 
proposed by Srull & Wyer (1989) explains memory for behavioral 
information with the help of associations among behaviors, traits and 
stereotypes (or person concepts). They argue that the activation of a 
stereotype may strengthen associations between stereotype-consistent trait-
behavior clusters and the "central person concept" or the stereotype. The 
probability of recall of items from memory is explained in terms of the 
relative strength of the associations of these items with other bits of 
information. Stereotype activation may enhance the strength of associations 
of stereotype-consistent information with the concept4. Such a model could 
account for impaired recall of stereotype-inconsistent information 
(organized in a stereotype-inconsistent trait) only by predicting a relative 
decrease of the strength of associations of stereotype-inconsistent 
information as a result of the relative increase of the accessibility of 
stereotype-consistent information, because the latter would lower the 
probability of retrieving stereotype-inconsistent information. However, 
considering the results of experiment 4, this explanation seems somewhat 
implausible. First, deteriorated recall of stereotype-inconsistent information 
was also obtained when there was no stereotype-consistent information 
present in the stimulus information. Secondly, recall of stereotype-
inconsistent information suffered from afterwards stereotype activation, 
while stereotype-neutral information did not. 
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The above argument suggests that, in order to account for impaired 
retrieval of stereotype-inconsistent information, models of social memory 
should incorporate mechanisms accounting for suppressed (or inhibited) 
access to stereotype-inconsistent traits. For this purpose, one might think of 
extending associative network models by introducing negative associations 
(e.g. of the type "hooligans are not intelligent") as, for instance, proposed in 
the spreading activation model (see e.g. Collins & Loftus, 1975; see, for a 
more extensive discussion of this issue, Blair & Banaji, 1996; Dijksterhuis & 
van Knippenberg, 1996b, Chapter 5). Such extended or modified models 
might be capable of describing and predicting impaired access to stereotype-
inconsistent information by postulating the active dissociation of trait and 
concept through a posteriori stereotype activation. 
Apart from the significance of biased retrieval with respect to 
associative network models (Hamilton, Driscoll & Worth, 1989: Hastie, 1980; 
Srull & Wyer, 1989), our research may have more general implications for 
research on impression formation and stereotyping. Recently, the emphasis 
in this line of research shifted towards conditions of stereotype use (e.g. 
Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990) and, although this idea is not new 
(Allport, 1954, Lippman, 1922), towards the function of stereotypes as 
simplifying structures (e.g. Bargh, 1989; Devine, 1989; Dijksterhuis & van 
Knippenberg, 1995b, 1996b, Chapter 5; Dijksterhuis, van Knippenberg, 
Kruglanski & Schaper, 1996; Dovidio, Evans & Tyler, 1986; Fox, 1992; Fiske & 
Taylor, 1991; Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Hamilton, Sherman & Ruvolo, 1990; 
Macrae, Milne & Bodenhausen, 1994; Macrae, Hewstone & Griffiths, 1993; 
Macrae, Stangor & Milne, 1994; Medin, 1988; Stangor & Duan, 1991). In most 
of this research and theorizing, the focus is basically on the influence of 
stereotypes on the increased accessibility and use of stereotype-consistent 
information. That is, the core concept in most research is consistency (or 
congruency, or stereotypicality). Although this research and theorizing may 
enhance our knowledge of the function of stereotypes and the 
circumstances under which stereotypes are used, it may be argued that 
studying the conditions under which stereotypes impede access to 
counterstereotypic information can add considerably to our understanding 
of stereotypes as well. Stereotypes may operate as knives that cut both ways, 
not only facilitating access to information fitting in with a stereotype, but 
also obstructing access to information that conflicts with it (cf. Dijksterhuis 
& van Knippenberg, 1996b, Chapter 5). 
Considering the present theoretical ideas and empirical results, it is 
tempting to speculate on the significance of facilitatory and inhibitory effects 
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of stereotype activation for memory and, indeed, for social perception. In a 
sense, our guided search explanation of a posteriori stereotype effects can be 
understood as a more elaborate account of the nature of the memory 
'reconstruction' process as Snyder called it (cf. Snyder & Uranowitz, 1978; 
Snyder, 1981). Stereotypes — here conceived of as mental representations of 
social groups — may serve to understand 'social reality' both by providing 
the perceiver with knowledge of what a group is like, and with knowledge 
of what a group is not like. Understanding social reality may 
simultaneously require the activation of appropriate knowledge and the 
suppression of inappropriate, or competing, knowledge (cf. Gernsbacher & 
Faust, 1991). Facilitation of access to stereotype-consistent information and 
inhibition of access to stereotype-inconsistent information may, as two sides 
of coin, complementarity contribute to stereotype stability and persistence. 
Since many judgments we make about persons and groups are based 
on available information in memory (see Hastie & Park, 1986), biased 
retrieval may explain why memory-based judgments are biased in a 
stereotypical manner and, as a result, why stereotypes are hard to change 
(see e.g., Kunda & Oleson, 1995). Suppose we see a woman in a restaurant 
giving an outrageous tip and we come to the conclusion that she is far from 
stingy. Then, she says to the waiter that the meal, raw herring in cream, was 
delicious and her accent betrays that she is Dutch. Theoretically, this would 
make it difficult to remember her giving the tip, and, as a consequence, the 
Dutch may still be perceived as a bunch of misers. In sum, a stereotype may 
protect itself by suppressing the retrieval of counterstereotypic information. 
Notes 
1. This chapter was published as van Knippenberg & Dijksterhuis (1996). 
2. For the sake of simplicity, guided retrieval is depicted here as a conscious 
process. However, as will be explained later, evidence suggests that 
nonconscious processes are involved. 
3. Except for a three-way Number of traits (one vs two) χ Group (professors 
vs hooligans) χ Item type (stereotype-consistent vs stereotype-inconsistent 
information) interaction (F (1, 96)= 7.52, ρ < .008). Cell means indicate that 
subjects recalled stereotype-consistent information with greater ease than 
stereotype-inconsistent information, except under one-trait soccer-hooligans 
conditions. Importantly, the four way Stereotype activation χ Number of 
traits χ Group χ Item type interaction was not significant (F (1,96)= .00, ρ < 1). 
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4. In this case, concept stands for the group or person with which the 
behavioral information was originally associated. 
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Chapter 5 
The knife that cuts both ways: Facilitated and inhibited access to 
traits as a result of stereotype activation1 
"Selective perception is as much a functional necessity as is veridical 
perception We have first to select what we shall see; in so doing, we 
become hypervigilant toward some cues and indifferent or actively 
defensive toward others." (G.W. Allport, 1960, p. 297). 
Facilitatory and inhibitory effects of stereotype activation were studied 
in three experiments. It was proposed that, in semantic memory, social 
categories are positively associated with stereotype-consistent traits and 
negatively with stereotype-inconsistent traits. Based on theçe postulated 
associations, it was predicted that priming a category label would facilitate 
access to stereotype-consistent trait concepts and obstruct access to 
inconsistent trait concepts. In three experiments, primed subjects were 
compared to no-prime control subjects, and comparisons were made 
between consistent, inconsistent and irrelevant traits using different 
measures of accessibility. The predicted facilitatory and inhibitory effects 
were both obtained, suggesting that stereotype activation actively increases 
the retrieval probability of consistent traits and actively decreases the 
retrieval probability of inconsistent traits. The implications of our findings 
with respect to impression formation and stereotyping are discussed. 
In most research on stereotype activation, stereotypes are interpreted 
as mental representations in which a social category (e.g., professor) is 
associated with traits that are (stereo)typical for this category (e.g., intelligent, 
industrious; see Stangor & Lange, 1994). Indeed, it has been shown that the 
activation of a stereotype results in the activation of semantically related 
trait terms or evaluatively consistent terms (Devine, 1989; Dovidio, Evans 
& Tyler, 1986; Gaertner & McLaughlin, 1983; Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Lepore & 
Brown, 1994; Locke, MacLeod & Walker, 1994; Macrae, Bodenhausen & 
Milne, 1995; Macrae, Stangor & Milne, 1994; Perdue, Dovidio, Gurtman & 
Tyler, 1990; Perdue & Gurtman, 1990). In three studies conducted by Macrae, 
Stangor and Milne (1994) subjects were primed with a stereotype. Subjects 
were asked to think extensively about a category for five minutes and to list 
behaviors, lifestyle and appearance of a typical member of this social 
category. Later, in an ostensibly unrelated task, subjects were asked to 
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identify traits as fast as possible (study 1 and 2). These traits were either 
consistent, neutral or inconsistent with respect to the stereotype 
(inconsistent traits were only presented in the first study). These traits were 
difficult to identify because they were hidden behind a dot pattern (study 1) 
or in word puzzles (study 2). In the first study, where the density of the dot 
pattern decreased stepwise, gradually revealing the target word, primed 
subjects were able to identify consistent words faster than neutral or 
inconsistent words. Similar findings were obtained in their second study. 
These results suggest that, due to a process of spreading activation, priming 
of a stereotype facilitates access to consistent traits. 
In the present article, it is argued that stereotypes are knives that cut 
both ways. That is, we propose that stereotype activation not only facilitates 
access to consistent traits —as demonstrated in several studies cited above—, 
but also inhibits access to inconsistent traits. For example, the activation of 
the term soccer hooligan is not only expected to enhance access to the word 
'aggressive' (i.e. a stereotype-consistent trait), but also to reduce access to the 
word 'intelligent' (i.e. a stereotype-inconsistent trait). Theoretically, our 
'double-edged knife' view on stereotypes would require that stereotypes are 
conceived of as networks containing not only positive associations between 
the social category label and consistent traits, but also negative associations 
between the category label and inconsistent traits. In this view, stereotype 
activation would entail increased access to positively associated traits as well 
as decreased access to negatively associated traits. 
The concept of negative associations has been postulated before. For 
instance, in their theory of semantic processing, Collins and Loftus (1975) 
suggested that words share both positive and negative associations in 
memory. In their view, a definition of a concept is manifested by both 
positive relations (e.g., a bird is an animal) and negative relations (e.g., a 
bird is not a fish). With regard to our present use of the 'positively' and 
'negatively' associated traits terminology, it is worth noting that these terms 
are rooted in the neural analogy in which the activation of a node may 
respectively increase or decrease the activation threshold of an adjacent 
node which enhances or reduces the latter's probability of 'firing' (see e.g., 
Eccles, 1964; see also Anderson & Spellman, 1995; Neumann & DeSchepper, 
1992). In terms of associative network models (e.g., Srull & Wyer, 1989; 
Stangor & Lange, 1994), negative associations obviously cannot imply 
negative numerical values of the stereotype-trait link, simply because of 
Stereotypes and memory 75 
inherent mathematical constraints in such models (specifically, because 
probabilities are, by definition, non-negative). 
Nevertheless, one may explicate positive and negative association 
effects in terms of associative network models as comparative effects of 
stereotype activation. That is, compared to the absence of stereotype 
activation (i.e. when the perceiver searches for traits without schema or 
stereotype guidance), the activation of a stereotype may enhance or reduce 
retrieval probabilities, depending on what we have called positive (i.e. 
stereotype-consistent traits) and negative (i.e. stereotype-inconsistent traits) 
associations. In concrete terms, suppose that access to traits (i.e. retrieval 
probability) is .50 irrespective of whether these traits are consistent, neutral 
or inconsistent to any unprimed stereotype we might want to study. Our 
present argument, then, entails that activation of a specific stereotype would 
enhance the retrieval probability of the positively associated (stereotype-
consistent) traits to, say, .75, and reduce the retrieval probability of 
negatively associated (stereotype-inconsistent) traits, to, say, .25, while 
retrieval probability of neutral (or irrelevant) traits would be unaffected by 
stereotype activation. 
Inhibited access 
While the notion of facilitated access to consistent traits after 
stereotype activation is widely accepted (see, e.g., Stangor & Lange, 1994, for a 
review), the idea that stereotype activation may actually suppress access to 
inconsistent traits seems to be relatively neglected in stereotype research. 
Before turning to tests of the ideas outlined above, some relevant empirical 
evidence for inhibitory effects of stereotype activation (or activation of other 
concepts) is briefly discussed. 
First, results obtained in studies of Perdue and colleagues (Perdue, 
Dovidio, Gurtman & Tyler, 1990; Perdue & Gurtman, 1990; see also Dovidio 
& Gaertner, 1993) point at possible semantic inhibition in the stereotype 
domain. Perdue and Gurtman (1990, exp. 2) asked subjects to judge trait-
words on their evaluative connotation. Before each decision, subjects were 
subliminally primed, either with the word "young" or with the word "old". 
The lowest response latencies were obtained for the pairings of the prime 
"young" and the positive trait words, indicating that this prime facilitated 
access to the positive trait terms. More importantly in the present context, 
response latencies for the pairings of the prime "young" with the negative 
words were higher than the pairings of the prime "old" with both negative 
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and positive traits. This finding may imply active inhibition of the negative 
trait words that are inconsistent with the prime "young". Comparable effects 
were obtained by Perdue, Dovidio, Gurtman and Tyler (1990) who primed 
subjects with words designating ingroup (e.g., we, us) or outgroup (e.g., they, 
them). 
Some support for the idea of inhibition of stereotype-inconsistent 
information is provided by recent studies conducted by Dijksterhuis & van 
Knippenberg (1995a, Chapter 2; van Knippenberg & Dijksterhuis, 1996, 
Chapter 4). In these studies, subjects were presented with a series of 
behavioral descriptions about members of a group. After subjects read the 
behavioral descriptions, a stereotype (e.g., soccer-hooligans) was activated. A 
comparison with a control condition in which no stereotype was activated 
showed that recognition (Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1995a, Chapter 2) 
and recall (van Knippenberg & Dijksterhuis, 1996, Chapter 4) of information 
inconsistent with the stereotype suffered from the activation of the 
stereotype. It seemed that stereotype activation inhibited access to 
inconsistent behavioral information in memory. 
Other support for inhibitory processes comes from outside the 
stereotype domain. Neely (1977) for instance, found that experimenter 
induced expectations may actively inhibit access to words inconsistent with 
this expectancy. Furthermore, evidence for inhibition of evaluatively laden 
information may be found in the domain of attitude research, specifically, 
in studies investigating the automatic evaluation effect (e.g., Bargh, 
Chaiken, Govender & Pratto, 1992; Bargh, Chaiken, Raymond & Hymes, 
1996; Chaiken & Bargh, 1993; Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell and Kardes, 1986). 
In these studies, priming of an attitude inhibits access to a word that is 
evaluatively inconsistent with this attitude. 
The studies cited above provide suggestive evidence for inhibition 
effects. The most pertinent studies (Perdue, Dovidio, Gurtman & Tyler, 
1990; Perdue & Gurtman, 1990), however, do not allow us to disentangle 
enhanced access to consistent traits and reduced access to inconsistent traits 
because of the absence of control conditions in which no stereotypes are 
activated. Because of the lack of no-prime control conditions, the 
contribution of facilitation and inhibition effects to the observed differential 
access to consistent and inconsistent traits cannot be established. In other 
words, when after priming a social category, one finds that consistent trait 
words are more accessible than inconsistent trait words, one may only draw 
conclusions regarding the relative accessibility of consistent and 
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inconsistent traits. That is, higher accessibility of consistent traits in 
comparison to inconsistent traits may indicate facilitation effects, or 
inhibition effects, or both. 
Three studies were conducted to test facilitatory and inhibitory effects 
of stereotype activation. The data were obtained in a task that was ostensibly 
unrelated to the priming procedure (see Higgins & Bargh, 1987; Higgins, 
Rholes & Jones, 1977; Macrae, Stangor & Milne; 1994; Wyer & Srull, 1986). 
The priming procedure was the same as in the experiments conducted by 
Macrae et al. (1994). Subjects were asked to think about a member of a social 
category and to write down anything that came to mind with respect to the 
behaviors, lifestyle and appearance of a typical member. As dependent 
variables we used response latencies (exp. 1) and identification of difficult to 
detect words (exp. 2 and 3). 
The hypotheses were the same for all experiments. We expected 
priming to facilitate access to consistent trait words (indicated by lower 
response latencies or by better recognition of consistent words for primed 
subjects in comparison to no-prime control subjects) and we expected 
priming to inhibit access to inconsistent trait words (indicated by higher 
response latencies or worse recognition of inconsistent words for primed 
subjects in comparison to no-prime control subjects). 
Experiment 1: Method 
Subjects 
Ninety-six undergraduate students participated in the experiment 
receiving Dfl. 5. (approx. US$ 3). All subjects were randomly assigned to 
either a prime or a no-prime control condition. 
Procedure and Stimulus materials 
The experiment was announced as a study of word recognition. Upon 
entering the laboratory, subjects were told that there was some delay in 
comparison to the schedule. Then, all subjects were placed in cubicles 
containing an Apple Macintosh computer and a button box designed to 
measure reaction latencies. Half of the subjects (i.e. no-prime control 
subjects) were told to relax for about five minutes before the experimenter 
would return to start the word recognition experiment. The other half of 
the subjects (i.e. the subjects in the prime condition) were asked whether or 
not they would mind helping a colleague of the experimenter to collect 
material for a forthcoming experiment. All subjects agreed and were then 
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asked to imagine a typical soccer hooligan for five minutes and to write 
down behaviors, life style and appearance attributes (cf. Macrae et al., 1994). 
This explicit instruction was given because, as in the Macrae et al., (1994) 
experiments, it was important that subjects would not list traits, because 
facilitatory effects of stereotypic traits could then be attributed to the effect 
that some of the traits were already retrieved during the priming stage2. 
After five minutes the computer program containing the word-recognition 
task was started by the experimenter. 
The computer program provided all the instructions. Subjects were 
told that 36 words would appear on the screen in random order and that 
eighteen words were existing Dutch words and the other eighteen were 
nonsense words. On the table in front of the subjects there was a special 
button box with only two buttons (a "yes" and a "no" button, the -left vs. 
right- location of these "yes" and "no" buttons was counterbalanced). In 
order to obtain maximum speed during this task, subjects were asked to 
keep their hands near the buttons throughout the task. For every word 
appearing on the screen, they were asked to decide as fast as possible 
whether a word was a meaningful word or a nonsense word. Subjects were 
asked to indicate their decision by pushing the "yes" or the "no" button. All 
words appeared in the center of the computer screen. Four seconds after 
subjects pushed the button, the next word appeared on the screen. 
The eighteen existing words were all trait words. These traits were 
gathered from a pilot-study in which forty subjects rated soccer hooligans on 
56 traits. Nine-point scales were used with poles labeled "soccer hooligans 
are not at all...(l)" and "soccer hooligans are very...(9)". Six traits were 
chosen that were consistent with the stereotype of soccer hooligans 
(aggressive, violent, prejudiced, insolent, insurgent, fanatic, M=7.54, srf=.84), 
six traits were chosen that were inconsistent with the stereotype of soccer 
hooligans (intelligent, friendly, understanding, industrious, thoughtful, 
tolerant; M=2.71, sd=.75) and six traits were chosen that were irrelevant with 
respect to soccer hooligans (spontaneous, adventurous, nervous, 
introverted, happy, persuasive; M= 5.22, srf=.80)3. The length of the words 
was controlled for. That is, the mean length of the consistent traits (M=8.4 
characters), the inconsistent words (M=8.4 characters) and the irrelevant 
traits (M=8.2 characters) was virtually equal. 
After subjects completed the word recognition task they were 
thanked, paid and debriefed. The debriefing indicated that subjects were 
unaware of the connection between the two tasks (some subjects actually 
asked when the experiment on soccer hooligans was planned to start). 
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Results and Discussion 
To reduce extreme variance and to obtain a normal distribution, all 
response latencies higher than 2500 ms. (mean + 3 χ standard deviation) 
were excluded from all analyses (1.4 % of the responses). Furthermore, 
wrong responses (i.e., when subjects indicated that an existing word was a 
nonsense word; 2.1 % of the responses to existing words, and when subjects 
indicated that a nonsense word was an existing word; 1.3 % of the responses 
to nonsense words) were excluded. 
As can be seen in Table 1, primed subjects reponded faster to 
consistent traits than no-prime control subjects, indicating facilitation. 
Furthermore, primed subjects reponded slower to inconsistent traits than 
no-prime control subjects, indicating inhibition. Mean response latencies 
for consistent, inconsistent and irrelevant traits were calculated and were 
subjected to a 2 (Prime: prime vs. no-prime) between-subjects χ 3 (Trait type; 
consistent traits, inconsistent traits, irrelevant traits) within-subjects 
ANOVA. This analysis indeed revealed the predicted two-way interaction of 
prime by trait type (F(2,93)= 8.09, ρ < .002). While there were no different 
response latencies for different trait types under no-prime control 
conditions (F(2,93)= 1.90, n.s.), these differences were highly significant 
under prime conditions (F(2,93)= 8.89, ρ < .001). 
Table 1. Mean response latencies on traits as a function of priming (in ms.). 
Means with different subscripts differ significantly (p < .05) 
consistent inconsistent irrelevant 
no-prime 682bc 626
a
b 601
a
b 
prime 570
a
 736
c
 680bc 
The facilitation and inhibition effects were statistically reliable. 
Consistent traits were responded to faster when subjects were primed 
compared to response latencies for the same traits in the no-prime control 
conditions (F(l,93)= 5.91, ρ < .02). Furthermore, response latencies were 
higher for inconsistent traits compared to latencies for these traits under no-
prime control conditions (F(l,93)= 4.09, ρ < .05). No differences between 
experimental conditions were obtained for irrelevant traits (F(l,93)= 1.61, 
n.s.). 
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These results replicate earlier findings in which stereotype activation 
facilitated access to evaluatively consistent words (e.g., Dovidio, Evans & 
Tyler, 1986; Gaertner & McLaughlin, 1983; Perdue & Gurtman, 1990) and 
findings in which stereotype activation facilitated access to stereotypical 
traits (e.g., Devine, 1989; Macrae, Stangor & Milne, 1994). Furthermore, our 
results show the converse effect as well. Stereotype activation not only 
facilitates access to consistent traits, it also actively reduces access to 
inconsistent traits. 
In our second and third study, the notion of increased access to 
consistent traits and reduced access to inconsistent traits was tested in 
different tasks to test the robustness and the generalizability of the effects 
obtained in experiment 1. Therefore subjects were asked to identify words 
that were hidden in a complex stimulus array. Our predictions are the same 
as in experiment 1. If priming causes facilitated access to consistent traits and 
inhibited access to inconsistent traits, processing or recognizing these traits 
in a subsequent task should be affected accordingly (cf. Macrae et al., 1994). 
Therefore, it is expected that consistent traits are identified with greater ease 
in a complex stimulus pattern and that inconsistent traits are identified 
with greater difficulty in a complex stimulus pattern by primed subjects 
compared to no-prime control subjects. 
In experiment 2, we also investigated a different stereotype. In 
experiment 1, we used a negative stereotype. As a consequence, all 
consistent traits were negative and all inconsistent traits were positive. In 
experiment 2, we primed subjects with a positive stereotype. This enabled us 
to use positive consistent traits and negative inconsistent traits as stimulus 
materials. 
Experiment 2: Method 
Subjects 
Fifty-two undergraduate students participated in the experiment 
receiving Dfl. 5. All subjects were randomly assigned to either a prime or a 
no-prime control condition. 
Procedure and Stimulus materials 
Subjects were told that the experiment was conducted to study word 
recognition. Again, upon entering the laboratory, subjects were placed in 
one of the cubicles and asked to relax for a few minutes until the computer 
program could be started (no-prime control subjects) or to help with 
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gathering material for a forthcoming experiment (primed subjects). In the 
prime condition, subjects were asked to think about a typical professor and 
to list typical behaviors, lifestyle and appearance (cf. Macrae et al., 1994). 
After five minutes, a message appeared on the computer screen 
stating that the experiment was about to begin. Subjects were asked to start 
reading the instructions. After the instructions, subjects were presented 
with word puzzles. Subjects were asked to identify trait words that were 
hidden in these word puzzles. The way the words were presented was based 
on a popular game on Dutch television. On the screen, three rows of 
characters appeared. To identify the word, subjects had to pick a character 
from each column. As can be seen in the example, the first and the last 
character were fixed. The second character had to be chosen from the second 
column, the third character form the third column and so on to the last 
column. The characters were about 8 millimeters high. An example is given 
below: 
Figure 1. Example of a stimulus word (experiment 2). 
Ε Ο Ν Η Κ E 
S F M K T A P N 
Ρ G О В N A 
Reading the bold characters from left to right reveals "spontaan" (which is 
Dutch for "spontaneous"). Of course, in the actual task, the target characters 
were not bold printed. 
All word puzzles appeared on the screen for forty seconds. If subjects 
identified the word, they were given fifteen seconds to write the word down 
on a sheet of paper. If subjects failed to recognize the word within forty 
seconds, they were simply given a fifteen seconds break until the next word 
appeared on the screen. The puzzles were presented in random order. 
Eighteen trait words were hidden in the puzzles. These traits were 
gathered from a pilot-study in which fourty subjects rated professors on 56 
traits. Nine-point scales were used with poles labeled "professors are not at 
all...(l)" and "professors are very...(9)". Six traits were chosen that were 
consistent with the stereotype of a professor (intelligent, industrious, 
understanding, thoughtfiil, friendly, serious; M=7.48, sd=.67), six traits were 
chosen that were inconsistent with the stereotype (aggressive, violent, 
insolent, prejudiced, naive, cruel; M=2.57, sd=.86) and six that were 
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irrelevant with respect to the stereotype (happy, adventurous, spontaneous, 
nervous, fanatic, tolerant; M= 5.06, sd=.81). 
After subjects completed this task they were thanked, paid and 
debriefed. Again, subjects perceived the two tasks as distinct, unrelated tasks. 
Results and Discussion 
The percentages of correctly identified consistent, irrelevant and 
inconsistent traits were calculated for each subject. Incorrectly identified 
words, making up for 0.7 % of the data, were excluded. 
As can be seen in Table 2, the pattern of cell means again reveals the 
predicted facilitatory and inhibitory effects. Primed subjects identified 
stereotype-consistent traits with greater ease and stereotype-inconsistent 
traits with greater difficulty than no-prime control subjects. The number of 
correctly identified traits were subjected to a 2 (Prime: prime vs. no-prime) 
between-subjects χ 3 (Trait type: consistent, inconsistent and irrelevant) 
within-subjects ANOVA. The predicted interaction of prime with trait type 
was highly significant (F(2,49)= 8.76, ρ < .002). Recognition percentages for 
different types of traits did not differ under no-prime control conditions 
(F(2,49)= 1.48, n.s.). As predicted, recognition for different traits in the prime 
condition differed (F(2,49)= 8.41, ρ < .002). 
Table 2. Percentages of correctly identified traits as a function of priming. 
Means with different subscripts differ significantly (p < .06) 
consistent inconsistent irrelevant 
no-prime 71.3b 78.2b 73.0b 
prime 85.5c 66.7
a
 76.9b 
Simple main effects revealed that consistent traits were better 
identified by primed subjects compared to control subjects (F(l,49)= 3.71, ρ < 
.06), while the reverse was true for inconsistent traits (F(l,49)= 4.00, ρ < .06). 
No different percentages were obtained for irrelevant traits (F(l,49)= .29, 
n.s.). In sum, then, although simple main effects only approached statistical 
significance, facilitation and inhibition effects due to stereotype activation 
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seem to have occurred in this experiment as well, thereby replicating the 
results of experiment 1. 
In our third experiment, we closely replicated experiment 2. The 
robustness of the effects was tested with word-puzzles that are more 
complex. In experiment 2, our critical tests of facilitation and inhibition just 
failed to reach the .05 level of significance. This was probably due to the fact 
that some subjects seemed to be much better in solving the puzzles than 
others, which led to high between-subjects variance. Therefore, in 
experiment 3, we included a covariate in the experiment to be able to 
control for extreme differences between subjects with regard to the ease with 
which the puzzles are solved. 
Experiment 3: Method 
Subjects 
Sixty undergraduate students participated in the experiment receiving 
Dfl. 5. All subjects were randomly assigned to either a prime or a no-prime 
control condition. 
Procedure and Stimulus materials 
Subjects were told that the experiment was conducted to study word 
recognition. All subjects were placed in cubicles containing an Apple 
Macintosh computer. The computer program provided all the instructions. 
Subjects were first asked to identify fifteen well-known Dutch cities in word 
puzzles. This measure served as a covariate to control for between-subjects 
variance. Subjects were told that there would be a five minute break after 
the first task. As a rationale, it was said that the task was difficult and that 
we did not want fatigue to influence the later trials. 
The way the words were presented was slightly modified compared to 
experiment 2 in which the first and the last character were given. On the 
screen, three rows of characters appeared. To identify the word, subjects first 
had to pick one of the characters in the left column. The second character 
had to be chosen from the second column, the third character from thè third 
column and so on to the last column. An example of a hidden Dutch city is 
given below: 
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Figure 2. Example of a stimulus word (experiment 3). 
P A S T H R H E M 
A F V K E I M A L 
N M G O B D D K E 
Reading the bold characters from left to right reveals "Amsterdam". Again, 
in the actual task, the target characters were not bold printed. 
All word puzzles appeared on the screen for forty seconds. If subjects 
had identified the word, they were given fifteen seconds to write the word 
down on a sheet of paper. If subjects failed to recognize the word within 
forty seconds, they were given a fifteen seconds break until the next word 
appeared on the screen. The words were presented in random order. After 
subjects were presented with fifteen cities, the priming task was introduced. 
Subjects were told that they were given a five minutes break. In the 
no-prime condition, subjects were simply asked to relax for five minutes 
until the computer program would continue. In the prime condition, 
subjects were told that they would receive an easy task before the next 
session of word recognition was to be started. Subjects were asked to think 
about a typical soccer-hooligan and to list his behaviors, lifestyle and 
appearance (cf. Macrae et al., 1994). They were told that this information was 
to be used in a forthcoming experiment of a colleague of the experimenter. 
After five minutes, subjects were again presented with word puzzles. 
This time, eighteen trait words were hidden in the puzzles. These traits 
were gathered in a pilot-study in which forty subjects rated soccer hooligans 
on 56 traits. Six stereotype-consistent, six stereotype-inconsistent and six 
irrelevant traits were selected (see Experiment 1.) These traits were 
presented in random order. After subjects completed this task they were 
thanked, paid and debriefed. Subjects' reactions in the debriefing indicated 
that the break we introduced was perceived as a genuine break. The word 
recognition task was indeed perceived as very difficult (also indicated by the 
overall mean recognition of less than 50 %). 
Results and Discussion 
The number of correctly identified words was counted for each 
subject. Again, incorrect identifications (2.8 %) were excluded from all 
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analyses. As can be seen in Table 3, where adjusted cell means are listed, 
facilitation effects and inhibition effects were again obtained. We subjected 
the data to a 2 (Prime: no-prime vs. prime) between-subjects χ 3 (Trait type: 
consistent traits, inconsistent traits and irrelevant traits) within-subjects 
analysis of covariance with the percentage of identified Dutch cities as a 
covariate. The regression of recognition of the Dutch cities on recognition 
for consistent traits (F= 9.44, ρ < .004), on recognition of inconsistent traits 
(F= 45.60, ρ < .0001) and on recognition of irrelevant traits (F= 43.96, ρ < 
.0001), was significant. A test of the homogeneity of the covariance matrices 
indicated that they did not differ significantly between different types of 
traits, Box's M= F (10,14821)= .96, n.s.). 
As predicted, the prime χ trait type interaction was significant 
(F(2,57)= 8.31, ρ < .002). Again, no differential recognition percentages were 
observed under no-prime control conditions (F(2,57)= 1.20, n.s.), while these 
differences were highly significant under prime conditions (F(2,57)= 21.63, ρ 
< .001). 
Table 3. Percentages of correct identified traits as a function of priming 
(adjusted means). Means with different subscripts differ significantly (p < 
.05) 
consistent inconsistent irrelevant 
no-prime 43.0abc 49.9ς 47.4bc 
prime 62.7d 35.5
a
 37.9
a
b 
Simple main effects revealed that consistent traits were identified 
with greater ease by primed subjects compared to the identification of these 
items by no-prime control subjects (F(l,57)= 5.97, ρ < .02), while the reverse 
was true for inconsistent traits (F(l,57)= 8.42, ρ < .006). No statistically 
significant differences were obtained with respect to the irrelevant traits 
(F(l,57)= 2.80, ρ < .10). These data closely replicate our findings of 
experiment 2. That is, increased access to stereotype-consistent traits and 
decreases access to inconsistent traits due to stereotype activation was again 
obtained. However, the statistical evidence is considerably stronger in this 
experiment due to the inclusion of a covariate controlling for extreme 
between-subjects variance. 
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General discussion 
The main goal of these studies was to test a stereotype model which 
comprises both positive and negative associations between the stereotype 
and trait concepts. As in current models, positive stereotype-trait 
associations would account for facilitated access to consistent traits. In 
addition, the existence of negative stereotype-trait associations was 
postulated to predict and explain inhibited access to inconsistent traits 
resulting from stereotype activation. In sum, it was predicted that priming a 
stereotype would enhance access to stereotype-consistent traits and reduce 
access to stereotype-inconsistent traits. 
These expectations were supported in three experiments in which 
primed subjects were compared with no-prime control subjects. In all 
experiments, a priming procedure developed by Macrae et al., (1994) was 
used. In the first experiment, a lexical decision task was used. It was found 
that primed subjects responded faster to consistent traits and slower to 
inconsistent traits in comparison to responses on the same traits made by 
no-prime control subjects, corroborating the proposed facilitatory and 
inhibitory effects of stereotype activation. In experiment 2, subjects were 
asked to identify trait words that were hidden in word puzzles. Although 
the evidence was statistically weak, facilitation and inhibition effects were 
again obtained. In this identification task, primed subjects were able to 
identify consistent trait words better and inconsistent trait words worse in 
comparison to no-prime control subjects. In experiment 3, in which slightly 
modified puzzles were used, these results were replicated. In the 
experiments we made use of a positively evaluated stereotype (professors) as 
well as a negatively evaluated stereotype (soccer hooligans). Thus, in three 
experiments, besides demonstrating enhanced access to stereotype-
consistent traits, evidence was obtained that the stereotype prime reduced 
the access to stereotype-inconsistent traits, suggesting some sort of inhibitory 
mechanism. 
One might argue that a separate negative association concept, 
accounting for active reduction of access to inconsistent traits, is superfluous 
because enhanced access to consistent traits as such might suffice to explain 
reduced access to inconsistent traits. In associative network models (e.g., 
Stangor & Lange, 1994) the retrieval probability of concept 'i' (given an 
activated stereotype) is proposed to depend on the strength of association of 
the stereotype with concept i, divided by the summed associations of the 
stereotype with all other concepts. Thus, retrieval probability is not only 
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positively related to the strength of associative linkage of the concept 
involved but also negatively to the strengths of associative links of 
competing concepts. Consequently, reduced access to i could be explained 
solely as a result of enhanced access to other ('competing') concepts. 
Inhibition of access to inconsistent traits would then merely be the 
consequence of facilitated access to other traits. 
Whether or not negative associations need to be postulated crucially 
depends on the comparison of priming effects of inconsistent and irrelevant 
traits. If priming damages the identification of inconsistent traits more than 
the identification of irrelevant traits, the former effect cannot be accounted 
for by the competitively enhanced access to consistent traits, simply because 
the argument would require irrelevant traits to suffer from it to the same 
extent. Conversely, if priming does affect access to irrelevant traits as much 
as it does access to inconsistent traits, the present results would fit in with 
the current associative network formulations. 
To establish whether or not there were differential effects across 
experiments, we conducted a meta-analysis (cf. Mullen, 1989; Rosenthal 
1978; Rosenthal & Rubin, 1979) on our three experiments. To be able to 
compare the results of Experiment 1 with the results of Experiment 2 and 3, 
recognition percentages were calculated for Experiment 1. For every subject, 
the median was calculated from the sample of all eighteen response 
latencies (six for consistent traits, six for inconsistent traits and six for the 
irrelevant traits). Subsequently, we counted the relative number of 
consistent, inconsistent and irrelevant traits recognized faster than the 
median. Recognition of consistent traits was compared to recognition of the 
same traits under no-prime control conditions. The same analyses were 
conducted with respect to inconsistent traits and irrelevant traits. The meta­
analyses demonstrated that there was a facilitation effect for consistent traits 
(Z= 3.31, ρ < .0005, combined effect size .24), an inhibition effect for 
inconsistent traits (Z= 3.73, ρ < .00009, combined effect size .27) and, more 
importantly for the present purpose, no effect for irrelevant traits (Z= .13, p= 
.45). As these results show that priming strongly impeded access to 
stereotype-inconsistent traits, while access to irrelevant traits remained 
unaffected, it seems that inhibited access to inconsistent information cannot 
be interpreted solely as an epiphenomenon of competitively facilitated 
access to stereotype-consistent traits. Instead, the postulated concept of 
negative stereotype-trait associations may serve as an explanation for the 
observed inhibited access. 
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To explain the inhibitory effect of stereotype activation on stereotype-
inconsistent traits, we postulated the existence of negative stereotype-trait 
associations in semantic memory, that is, the activation of a stereotype 
makes it difficult to access traits that contradict the stereotype. The proposed 
mechanism is that the category label (e.g., soccer hooligan) hampers access to 
traits subjectively dissociated from that social category (e.g, intelligence). In 
the neural network metaphor, we suggest that activating the category 
concept raises the threshold for activation of category-inconsistent 
(stereotype-inconsistent) concepts, as if there were direct negative links 
between category and category-inconsistent concepts. The assumed nature of 
the inhibition effect would then be the active inhibition of inconsistent 
subordinate concepts. 
The explanation of inhibition proposed above entails a top-down 
mechanism, i.e., from category label to trait concept. It is, however, 
important to note that most recent findings on inhibitory processes are 
explained in terms of lateral inhibition. That is, activation of a construct 
inhibits a competing construct of the same level of abstractness or the same 
semantic category. Recently, Macrae, Bodenhausen and Milne (1996), for 
instance, showed that upon encountering a person (e.g., a Chinese woman), 
the activation of one social category (e.g, woman) inhibits the activation of 
the other social category (Chinese). In a similar vein, Bower (1981;1991) 
argues that the presence of an emotional state inhibits access to conflicting 
emotions. In concrete terms, when people are sad, the activation of a 
"sadness-node" may inhibit activation of a "happiness-node". These lateral 
inhibition mechanisms are fairly well documented in the past few years (see 
Blaxton & Neely, 1983; Gemsbacher & Faust, 1991; Neumann & DeSchepper, 
1992; Tipper, 1985; Tipper & Driver, 1988; see also, Anderson & Spellman, 
1995; Dagenbach & Carr, 1994 for overviews). 
On the other hand, the mechanism we suggested above, i.e. top-down 
or "vertical" inhibition, received less attention in the literature. However, 
there are some other data that point in the direction of this sort of 
inhibition. Blair and Banaji (1996; for comparable results, see Banaji & 
Hardin, 1996) primed subjects with either feminine primes, masculine 
primes or gender neutral primes. These primes referred to appearance, 
objects, activities, professions or roles. After subjects were primed, a name 
would appear on the computer screen. Subjects were asked to indicate as fast 
as possible whether the name was a female name or a male name. Apart 
from facilitatory effect (e.g., subjects reponded faster to female names after a 
female prime than after a gender-neutral prime), inhibitory effects were 
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obtained as well. For example, subjects responded significantly slower to 
male names after a female prime than after a neutral prime. In concrete 
terms, activation of an object (e.g., flowers) seems to result in inhibited 
access to a social category (e.g., men). 
It is possible though, to explain these results, as well as our own 
results in terms of lateral inhibition. Priming "flowers" may activate the 
social category "women", which in turn may laterally inhibit the competing 
category "men". Similarly, in our experiments, priming "soccer-hooligans" 
may activate the trait "stupidity", which in turn may have inhibited the 
opposite trait "intelligence". Whether our results should be explained in 
terms of vertical inhibition or in terms of lateral inhibition may be 
established in future research4. 
Inhibition, person impressions and stereotype maintenance 
Facilitated access to consistent traits and inhibited access to 
inconsistent information due to stereotype activation may be looked upon 
as dual effects of stereotypes, having complementary implications for 
information processing. While stereotypes render some information more 
accessible, thereby increasing its impact on perception and interpretation, 
other information becomes less accessible at the same time, thereby 
reducing its impact on perception and interpretation. In fact, stereotypes 
may function as tools that automatically foster the selective perception 
Allport argued to be important (see the opening statement of this paper). 
This conclusion may have some interesting implications for fields 
related to stereotyping. Stereotypes play a major role in impression 
formation (e.g., Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). Bargh, Higgins and co-
workers have produced a body of evidence indicating that the accessibility of 
a trait-construct influences the relative use of this trait on subsequent 
impression formation (e.g., Bargh, Lombardi & Higgins, 1988; Bargh & 
Pietromonaco, 1982; Bargh & Thein, 1985; Higgins, Bargh & Lombardi, 1985; 
Higgins, Rholes & Jones, 1977; see also Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1985; Erdley & 
D'Agostino, 1988; Srull & Wyer, 1979; 1980). Stereotype activation affects the 
accessibility of traits (see also Dovidio, Evans & Tyler, 1986; Macrae, Stangor 
& Milne, 1994) and, therefore, affects subsequent impression formation. 
Indeed, given an activated stereotype, the influence of a trait on judgment is 
positively related to its strength of association with the stereotype or 
category label (Stangor & Lange, 1994; see also Bargh, 1989; Brewer, 1988; 
Devine, 1989; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990: Macrae, Stangor & Milne, 1994). 
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Therefore, our present results suggest that, upon categorizing a target 
person, the probability that a stereotype-consistent trait will be used to 
interpret subsequent behavior will increase, and at the same time, the 
probability that a stereotype-inconsistent trait to be used in the impression 
formation process will decrease. In concrete terms, when one meets a right-
wing politician (and of course, when one knows that he or she is a right-
wing politician) the probability that, for instance, the trait constructs of 
close-mindedness, due to facilitation, will guide the impression formation 
process increases, and, due to inhibition, the probability that the construct of 
tolerance will guide impression formation will decrease. Thus stereotype 
activation (or categorization) instigates a dual mechanism fostering the 
formation of stereotype-confirming impressions and undermining the 
formation of stereotype-disconfirming impressions. 
Expanding on the dual mechanism explicated above, there may be 
implications for explanations of the rigidity of stereotypes as well. 
Stereotypes are hard to change (see e.g., Kunda & Oleson, 1995; Rothbart & 
John, 1985; Weber & Crocker, 1983). One of the reasons for this rigidity of 
stereotypes is that people interpret information a in biased, stereotypical 
manner (e.g., Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987; Crocker, Hannah & 
Weber, 1983; Devine, 1989; Sagar & Schofield, 1980). That is, behaviors 
performed by a target person are interpreted in a stereotype-confirming way. 
Furthermore, when people make meaning of other people's behavior, 
interpretation in terms of traits plays a major role (Gilbert & Malone, 1995; 
Jones & Nisbett, 1972; Newman, 1991; Newman & Uleman, 1989; Uleman 
1989; Uleman & Moskowitz, 1994). As noted above, the specific traits that 
will be used to interpret behavior are, at least partly, dependent on the 
relative accessibility of potentially available trait constructs (e.g., Bargh & 
Pietromonaco, 1982; Higgins, Rholes & Jones, 1977). It follows from this that 
facilitation of consistent traits after stereotype activation may increase the 
probability of stereotype-confirming interpretations of behaviors, and that 
inhibition of inconsistent traits after stereotype activation may decrease the 
probability of a stereotype-disconfirming interpretation. In concrete terms, a 
person helping an old man crossing the street may be perceived as friendly. 
However, knowing that the person is a skinhead decreases the possibility 
that this behavior is interpreted as friendly, since the concept of friendliness 
is inhibited. If this is indeed the case, the stereotypical conception of a 
skinhead is not violated and is not in need for reconsideration. 
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Especially the inhibition process may be highly beneficial. As people 
usually prefer to maintain their beliefs (such as stereotypes) over changing 
them, collecting evidence in favor of these beliefs may be helpful. However, 
it may even be more essential to avoid obtaining counter-evidence. 
Finally, the notion of obstructed access to inconsistent traits is 
important from a functional perspective. Stereotypes make information 
processing relatively easy (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Gilbert & 
Hixon, 1991; Macrae, Milne & Bodenhausen, 1994). As Macrae et al. (1994) 
pointed out, the use of a stereotype actively saves energy by preserving 
cognitive resources. The results reported in this article suggest that this is 
not only so because of the fact that helpful attributes come to mind after 
stereotype activation (i.e. facilitation), but also because potentially disturbing 
attributes are prevented from entering the stage (i.e. inhibition). In other 
words, stereotypes are tools (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Macrae, Milne & 
Bodenhausen, 1994) with two different functions. They automatically 
encourage the use of helpful and "appropriate" information and they 
discourage the use of disturbing and "inappropriate" information. 
Notes 
1. This chapter was published as Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg (1996b). 
2. As expected, throughout the three experiments, subjects hardly ever listed 
any traits during the priming stage. In three experiments (208 subjects), 
fourteen traits were listed. Only four times a trait was listed that was present 
in the stimulus materials. 
3. Of course, in the task Dutch trait words were used. Here, we report the 
English translations of the original traits. 
4. It is probably difficult to establish whether the inhibited access findings 
reported in the present article must be ascribed to top-down stereotype-trait 
inhibition or to lateral trait-antonym inhibition. For the time being, we see 
no obvious way to test, within the confines of the present experimental 
paradigm, which of these underlying mechanisms operate to bring about 
the observed inhibition of stereotype-inconsistent trait, basically because we 
cannot come up with traits without antonyms. To resolve this issue, then, 
new experimental paradigms may have to be developed. 
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Summary 
The topic of investigation in this thesis is the impact of stereotype 
activation on memory. Specifically, it is examined how a later activated 
stereotype affects the retrieval of earlier encoded information about a person 
or about members of a social group. In the first part of Chapter 1, results 
from earlier experiments are discussed indicating that people reconstruct 
earlier acquired information to bring it in line with later activated 
stereotypes. It was tentatively concluded that stereotype activation biased 
memory for earlier encoded information. Previous research showed that 
once a stereotype was activated, people recall stereotype-consistent 
information better than stereotype-inconsistent information. For example, 
upon hearing that a person is a soccer-hooligan, it is much easier to recall 
previous aggressive instances of this person's behavior than it is to recall 
friendly behavior performed by this person. On the basis of the available 
information, however, it was not clear whether stereotype activation 
facilitated retrieval of stereotype-consistent information, or whether it 
obstructed memory for stereotype-inconsistent information, or both. In the 
second part of Chapter 1, a tentative theoretical explanation was outlined 
and the most important results obtained in the experiments were 
summarized. 
In Chapter 2, the precise nature of the memory bias caused by 
stereotype activation was established. With this experiment, the question 
was addressed whether stereotype activation enhanced memory for 
stereotype-consistent information, or whether it reduced memory for 
stereotype-inconsistent information, or whether both effects would occur. 
Subjects were presented with behavioral information about social groups. 
Later, half of the subjects were told what these groups consisted of (that is, a 
stereotype was activated), while the remaining subjects did not receive this 
information. On the basis of data from a subsequent recognition task, it was 
concluded that stereotype activation hampered memory for stereotype-
inconsistent information, while memory for stereotype-consistent 
information was not affected. 
In Chapter 3, the organization of behavioral information in memory 
was studied. It was argued that behavior was encoded, stored and retrieved 
on the basis of their trait implications. For instance, the behavior "lends 
money to a friend", is encoded and stored under the trait "helpful". Trait 
implications, then, were expected to predict the accessibility of behavioral 
information in memory. In an experiment, subjects were presented with 
Stereotypes and memory 94 
information about a social group. Subjects either received stereotype-
consistent and stereotype-inconsistent information bearing on the same 
trait-dimension (e.g., intelligent and unintelligent behavior) or stereotype-
consistent and stereotype-inconsistent information bearing on different trait 
dimensions (e.g., intelligent and aggressive behavior). As predicted, data of a 
free recall task showed that trait implications were of crucial importance for 
the storage of behavioral information. Information with implications for 
the same trait dimension was stored together, that is, clustered together in 
memory in a common single trait-behavior cluster, while information 
pertaining to different trait dimensions was stored separately. 
In the first experiment in Chapter 4, the findings of experiment 1 in 
Chapter 2 were replicated with a free recall task instead of a recognition task. 
In experiment 2, the results on the organization of information in memory 
on the basis of traits obtained in the experiment reported in Chapter 2 were 
used to explain the finding that stereotypes decreased memory for 
stereotype-inconsistent information. It was predicted that access to 
stereotype-inconsistent behavioral information bearing on the same trait 
dimension as stereotype-consistent information would not suffer from an 
activated stereotype, because this information was supposed to be stored 
together with stereotype-consistent information. On the other hand, 
memory stereotype-inconsistent behavioral information stored separately 
was expected to decrease as a result of stereotype activation. In other words, 
it was argued that impaired recall of stereotype-inconsistent information 
would be 'moderated' by memorial organization, i.e. that it would only 
occur in the case of stereotype-inconsistent information being stored in a 
separate trait-behavior cluster and not when it is stored together with 
stereotype-consistent information in a single trait-behavior cluster. 
Experiment 2 indeed confirmed these predictions. 
In experiment 3, the assumed automaticity of inhibited access to 
inconsistent information after stereotype activation was investigated. Until 
then, this effect was described as unintentional and expected to happen 
without awareness. However, the observed decreased memory for 
stereotype-inconsistent information could have been the result of an 
intentional, strategic process. In experiment 3, subjects first received 
behavioral information. Subsequently, a stereotype was activated in an 
ostensibly unrelated experiment. Later, subjects were presented with a 
surprise free recall task. It was still observed that memory for stereotype-
inconsistent information was impeded. Since a strategic explanation would 
require the effect only to occur when the activated stereotype directly 
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pertains to the behavioral information, this alternative was ruled out. 
Instead, the conclusion was drawn that the observed effects were 
unintentional. In experiment 4, another alternative was examined. It was 
still possible that inhibited access to stereotype-inconsistent information is 
merely an epiphenomenon of the fact that stereotype-consistent 
information is rendered more accessible by stereotype activation. In 
experiment 4 the inhibited access to stereotype-inconsistent information 
finding was replicated in an experiment in which no stereotype-consistent 
information was presented to the subjects. Also, while memory for 
stereotype-inconsistent information was impeded, memory for irrelevant 
(neutral) information was not affected by stereotype activation. Hence, it 
was concluded that obstructed recall of stereotype-inconsistent information 
was not simply an epiphenomenon of higher accessibility of stereotype-
consistent information. On the basis of the data discussed in Chapter 4, it 
was concluded that stereotype-activation causes retrieval to be guided away 
from stereotype-inconsistent information, because access to stereotype-
inconsistent traits is automatically inhibited. 
Whether stereotypes indeed inhibit access to stereotype-inconsistent 
traits was examined in Chapter 5. In the experiments, stereotypes were 
activated ("primed") in a task ostensibly unrelated to the rest of the 
experiment. In a subsequent task, accessibility of traits was measured with a 
lexical decision task (experiment 1) or with a task in which traits were 
hidden in complex stimulus arrays (experiments 2 and 3). The results of 
these studies supported the assumption that stereotype activation inhibits 
access to stereotype-inconsistent traits. Compared to conditions under which 
stereotypes were not activated, stereotype-inconsistent traits were harder to 
access (i.e., recognized slower) than under conditions in which a stereotype 
was activated. These findings corroborated the idea that stereotypes actively 
guide the search in memory away from stereotype-inconsistent information 
by means of inhibition of stereotype-inconsistent traits. 
The implications of the findings for research on stereotyping, 
impression formation and memory for social information in general are 
discussed in the Discussion sections of Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. Stereotypes, 
it was concluded, function as knives that cut both ways, not only enhancing 
access to stereotype-consistent information, as was established in earlier 
research, but also obstructing access to inconsistent information. These 
automatic consequences of stereotype activation, we argued, may cause 
people to make stereotypic impressions of others and may, in part, explain 
why stereotypes are so hard to change. 
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Samenvatting 
Het onderzoek in dit proefschrift richt zich op invloed van 
stereotypen op het geheugen. We bestuderen de invloed van een later 
geactiveerd stereotype op de herinnering van eerder verwerkte informatie 
over personen en sociale groepen. In het eerste gedeelte van Hoofdstuk 1 
worden resultaten besproken van eerder onderzoek die er op wijzen dat 
mensen eerder verwerkte informatie reconstrueren aan de hand van later 
geactiveerde stereotypen. Er werd, voorlopig, geconcludeerd dat de activatie 
van stereotypen het geheugen voor eerder verwerkte informatie vertekent. 
Eerder onderzoek toonde aan dat wanneer een stereotype werd geactiveerd, 
mensen stereotype-consistente informatie beter herinnerden dan 
stereotype-inconsistente informatie. Wanneer mensen bijvoorbeeld horen 
dat een bepaalde persoon een voetbalvandaal is, is het makkelijker om van 
deze persoon agressief gedrag te herinneren dan om vriendelijk gedrag te 
herinneren. Het was echter niet duidelijk, gegeven de stand van zaken op 
dat moment, of de activatie van stereotypen zorgde voor een betere 
herinnering van stereotype-consistente informatie, of zorgde voor een 
slechtere herinnering van stereotype-inconsistente informatie, of beide. In 
het tweede gedeelte van Hoofdstuk 1 presenteren we een theoretische 
verklaring voor vertekende herinnering na stereotype-activatie en we 
bespreken de belangrijkste resultaten van de experimenten. 
In Hoofdstuk 2 werd de aard van de vertekende herinnering 
onderzocht. Met dit experiment wilden we te weten komen of activatie van 
een stereotype zorgt voor verbeterde herinnering van stereotype-consistente 
informatie, of voor verslechterde herinnering van stereotype-inconsistente 
informatie, of voor beide. Proefpersonen lazen informatie over twee sociale 
groepen. Later werd de helft van de proefpersonen verteld waaruit deze 
groepen bestonden (het stereotype werd geactiveerd), terwijl de andere 
proefpersonen deze informatie niet kregen. Op basis van de resultaten van 
een latere herkenningstaak werd geconcludeerd dat stereotype-activatie 
zorgt voor verslechterde herinnering van stereotype-inconsistente 
informatie terwijl herinnering van stereotype-consistente informatie niet 
verandert door activatie van een stereotype. 
In Hoofdstuk 3 werd de organisatie van informatie in het geheugen 
onderzocht. Het idee werd geopperd dat informatie wordt verwerkt, 
opgeslagen en herinnerd in termen van karaktereigenschappen. Zo word de 
gedraging "leent geld aan een vriend" opgeslagen onder de noemer 
"behulpzaam". Wij verwachtten dat deze karaktereigenschappen de 
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toegankelijkheid van informatie in het geheugen bepalen. In een 
experiment kregen proefpersonen informatie over een sociale groep. 
Proefpersonen kregen of stereotype-consistente en stereotype-inconsistent 
informatie die betrekking had op dezelfde karaktereigenschap (bijvoorbeeld 
intelligent en on-intelligent gedrag) of stereotype-consistent en stereotype-
inconsistente informatie die betrekking had op verschillende 
karaktereigenschappen (bijvoorbeeld intelligent en agressief gedrag). Met 
een vrije herinneringstaak werd, zoals voorspeld, aangetoond dat 
karaktereigenschappen een cruciale rol vervullen bij de opslag en 
herinnering van gedragsinformatie. Informatie met implicaties voor 
dezelfde karaktereigenschap wordt samen opgeslagen (dat wil zeggen, deze 
informatie wordt in hetzelfde cluster in het geheugen opgeslagen), terwijl 
informatie met implicaties voor verschillende eigenschappen apart wordt 
opgeslagen. 
In het eerste experiment van Hoofdsuk 4 repliceerden we het 
experiment van Hoofdstuk 2 met een vrije herinneringstaak in plaats van 
een herkenningstaak. In experiment 2 hebben we onze ideeën over de 
organisatie van informatie in het geheugen in termen van 
karaktereigenschappen gebruikt om het eerder verkregen resultaat van 
slechtere herinnering van stereotype-inconsistente informatie na 
stereotype-activatie te verklaren. We voorspelden dat de herinnering van 
stereotype-inconsistente informatie die betrekking had op dezelfde 
karaktereigenchap als stereotype-consistente informatie niet zou lijden 
onder de activatie van een stereotype, omdat deze stereotype-inconsistente 
informatie opgeslagen is in hetzelfde cluster in het geheugen als de 
stereotype-consistente informatie. Anderzijds werd voorspeld dat de 
herinnering van apart opgeslagen stereotype-inconsistente informatie wel 
zou lijden onder de activatie van een stereotype. Met andere woorden, het 
optreden van verslechterde herinnering van stereotype-inconsistente 
informatie zou afhankelijk zijn van de wijze waarop de informatie is 
opgeslagen. Alleen stereotype-inconsistente informatie die apart is 
opgeslagen zou moeilijker te herinneren zijn na activatie van een 
stereotype. Experiment 2 bevestigde deze voorspellingen. 
In experiment 3 werd bestudeerd of het gevonden effect -
verslechterde herinnering van stereotype-inconsistente informatie na 
stereotype-activatie - onintentioneel en onbewust is. Tot dan toe werd 
aangenomen dat het inderdaad een onbewust en onintentioneel proces is. 
Het effect kan echter het gevolg zijn geweest van een bewust, strategisch 
proces. In experiment 3 lazen proefpersonen eerst gedragsinformatie. Later 
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werd in een ongerelateerde taak een stereotype geactiveerd. Daarna kregen 
proefpersonen, onaangekondigd, een vrije herinneringstaak voorgelegd. 
Ook in dit geval werd stereotype-inconsistente informatie slechter 
herinnerd. Een strategisch, bewust proces kan alleen verantwoordelijk zijn 
voor verslechterde herinnering als het stereotype direct betrekking heeft op 
de eerder aangeboden informatie en niet als er "zomaar" een stereotype 
wordt geactiveerd. Er werd derhalve geconcludeerd dat de geheugeneffecten 
onintentioneel zijn en onbewust verlopen. In experiment 4 werd een 
andere alternatieve verklaring getoetst. Het was mogelijk dat verslechterde 
herinnering van stereotype-inconsistent informatie een gevolg is van de 
verhoogde toegankelijkheid van stereotype-consistente informatie na 
stereotype-activatie. In experiment 4 werd de verslechterde herinnering van 
stereotype-inconsistente informatie gerepliceerd in een experiment waarin 
geen stereotype-consistente informatie werd gebruikt. Terwijl herinnering 
van stereotype-inconsistente informatie verslechterde, was er geen effect 
van stereotype-activatie op herinnering van neutrale (ongerelateerde) 
informatie. Op grond daarvan werd geconcludeerd dat de verminderde 
herinnering van stereotype-inconsistent informatie niet simpelweg een 
gevolg of bijverschijnsel kon zijn van verhoogde toegankelijkheid van 
consistente informatie. Op basis van de resultaten van Hoofdstuk 4 werd 
geconcludeerd dat de activatie van stereotypen ervoor zorgt dat het 
terughalen van stereotype-inconsistente informatie uit het geheugen 
bemoeilijkt wordt doordat het zoeken in het geheugen weggeleid wordt van 
stereotype-inconsistente informatie. Dit wordt veroorzaakt doordat de 
toegang tot stereotype-inconsistente karaktereigenschappen geinhibeerd 
wordt door activatie van een stereotype. 
Of stereotypen inderdaad de toegang tot stereotype-inconsistente 
karaktereigenschappen inhiberen werd onderzocht in Hoofdstuk 5. In de 
experimenten werden stereotypen geactiveerd in een taak die zogenaamd 
ongerelateerd was aan de rest van het experiment. In een tweede taak werd 
de toegankelijkheid van karaktereigenschappen gemeten met een "lexical-
decision" taak (experiment 1) of met een taak waarbij de 
karaktereigenschappen verstopt waren in woord puzzles (experimenten 2 
en 3). De resultaten van de experimenten toonden aan dat de activatie van 
stereotypen inderdaad zorgt voor bemoeilijkte toegang tot stereotype-
inconsistente karaktereigenschappen. In vergelijking met controle-condities 
waarin geen stereotypen weiden geactiveerd, werden stereotype-
inconsistente karaktereigenschappen langzamer herkend na activatie van 
een stereotype. Deze gegevens bevestigden het vermoeden dat het zoeken in 
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het geheugen wordt weggeleid van stereotype-inconsistente informatie 
omdat de toegang tot stereotype-inconsistente karakter-eigenschappen 
wordt geinhibeerd. 
De gevolgen van de bevindingen voor gerelateerd onderzoek op het 
gebied van stereotypering alsmede voor onderzoek naar 
persoonswaarneming en onderzoek naar geheugen voor sociale informatie 
worden besproken in de Discussie-gedeelten van de Hoofdstukken 4 en 5. 
Een stereotype kan gezien worden als een mes dat aan twee kanten snijdt. 
Een stereotype verhoogt niet alleen de toegankelijkheid van consistente 
informatie, zoals is beschreven in eerder onderzoek, maar verlaagt ook de 
toegankelijkheid van inconsistente informatie. Deze automatische 
consequenties van stereotype-activatie kunnen verklaren waarom mensen 
vaak gestereotypeerde indrukken vormen van anderen en ook (deels) 
waarom stereotypen zo moeilijk te veranderen zijn. 
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4b. Af en toe zijn mensen weldenkende wezens. Zij zijn dit echter bij de 
gratie van gewoonte, routine en automatisme (dit proefschrift). 
4c. "Ik denk niet, dus ik besta" (Jean Cocteau, zie ook Bargh, 1994). 
4d. Eén van de belangrijkste, zo niet de belangrijkste taak van de 
experimentele psychologie is het ten grave dragen van de homunculus. 
5. Iemand die beweert dat soft-drugs gevaarlijk zijn en kernproeven niet, is 
niet geschikt voor een functie met ook maar enige verantwoordelijkheid. 
6. Theorieën die bijna alles kunnen verklaren zijn bruikbaar voor de 
borreltafel. 
7. Over smaak valt goed te twisten. 



